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This article examines cross-price promotional effects in a dynamic context. Among other things, we investigatewhether previously established findings hold when consumer and competitive dynamics are taken into
account. Five main influential effects (asymmetric price effect, neighborhood price effect, asymmetric share
effect, neighborhood share effect, and private label versus national brand asymmetry) appear jointly in the
second layer of a pooled HB-VEC-VARX model, together with brand- and category-specific variables. This study
tests the relative importance of these key factors across three scenarios: with no market dynamics, when only
consumer dynamics are considered, and when competitive reactions are also taken into account. The results
confirm all five influential effects, even if they are jointly estimated, and consumer and competitive dynamics
are taken into account. National brand/private label asymmetry has the strongest influence on the cross-price
promotional effects and becomes significantly stronger when consumer and competitive dynamics are taken
into account. Dynamic consumer responses and competitive reactions both affect cross-brand price elasticities,
and contrary to expectations, competitive reactions accumulate rather than diminish cross-price elasticities.
Preemptive switching does occur; i.e., a brand’s promotion in period t hurts a competitor’s sales in subsequent
periods. Our findings are based on an extensive data set. To attain generalizable results, we analyze 33 categories
in five stores—that is, 165 store/category combinations.
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1. Introduction
Previous research has made substantial progress in
quantifying the cross-brand effects of (promotional)
price changes and in identifying the factors that
moderate these effects (e.g., Allenby and Rossi 1991,
Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989, Bronnenberg and
Wathieu 1996, Sethuraman et al. 1999). Among the
moderators, there are five relevant asymmetric and
neighborhood effects: asymmetric price effect, neigh-
borhood price effect, asymmetric share effect, neigh-
borhood share effect, and private label versus national
brand asymmetry.
According to the literature, immediate cross-brand
price effects are asymmetric; that is, the impact of
brand A’s price change on brand B’s sales is not
the same as the impact of B’s price change on A’s
sales. Research also shows that high-tier brands have
a stronger effect than low-tier brands (e.g., Allenby
and Rossi 1991, Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989,
Bronnenberg and Wathieu 1996, Hardie et al. 1993,
Sivakumar and Raj 1997), that brands whose prices
are similar have greater cross-price effects than
brands that are priced farther apart (e.g., Kamakura
and Russell 1989, Russel 1992, Sethuraman 1995,
Sethuraman et al. 1999), and that larger brands
have a stronger influence on competing brands’ sales
than smaller brands (Sethuraman and Srinivasan
2002, Sethuraman et al. 1999). These phenomena are
referred to as asymmetric price effect, neighborhood
price effect, and asymmetric share effect, respectively.
Furthermore, according to the neighborhood share
effect, brands with similar sizes are expected to expe-
rience larger cross-price effects than brands with more
dissimilar sizes. Finally, according to the private label
versus national brand asymmetry, national brands
have been found to influence private labels more than
the other way around (e.g., Aggarwal and Cha 1998,
Blattberg and Neslin 1989, Sivakumar and Raj 1997).
Previous research has studied these effects in great
detail but misses two important aspects. First, it
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focuses primarily on immediate cross-brand effects
(Sivakumar 2000) of price changes and thus ignores
the notion that competing brands operate in a
dynamic environment. Second, although the different
asymmetric and neighborhood effects are connected
to each other, most extant research analyzes only a
subset of them. This article fills these gaps in the lit-
erature by incorporating marketing dynamics and a
broad set of variables into the analysis. We will first
separately discuss the literature on dynamics and on
moderators of cross effects. Next, we will further sub-
stantiate our contribution.
Two major dynamic processes have been identi-
fied that may influence the cross-brand effects of
price changes: consumer dynamics and competitive
dynamics. Consumer dynamics refers to consumers’
delayed responses to changes in price and in other
marketing variables. Such delay may arise, for exam-
ple, from the “additional inventory of the promoted
brand [that] preempts the consumers’ purchase of
a competing brand in the future” (Ailawadi et al.
2007, p. 450), resulting in a post-promotion dip for
other brands in the category (Van Heerde et al.
2003). Competitive dynamics represents the reactions
of competitors to a price change or another marketing
activity of a brand. In today’s intensely competitive
marketing environments, price promotions can easily
be matched by competitors, which may erase initial
sales and profit gains from promotions (Balachander
et al. 2010). The execution of most competitive reac-
tions takes time, however. Therefore, the influence of
competitive reactions emerges one or more periods
after the promotion.
Several authors warn against possible inaccurate
conclusions as a result of ignoring these dynamic
processes, and they emphasize that dynamics should
be taken into account to arrive at proper results.
Fok et al. (2006), Kopalle et al. (1999), and Pauwels
(2007) all stress the potential for erroneous conclu-
sions that stem from disregarding the presence of con-
sumer dynamics. Leeflang and Wittink (1996, 2001)
argue that ignoring (dynamic) competitive reactions
may lead to biased estimates of market responses to
price and other marketing variables. These findings
indicate that, rather than focusing only on immediate
effects, a more realistic approach is to account also
for dynamic consequences and concentrate on the so-
called cumulative effects (i.e., the sum of immediate
and all subsequent dynamic effects) of price changes
(see, e.g., Dekimpe et al. 1999, Fok et al. 2006, Horváth
et al. 2005, Pauwels et al. 2002) when analyzing cross-
price effects.
Concerning the moderators of cross effects, even
though the different asymmetric and neighborhood
effects are related, extant research has ana-
lyzed only a subset of them in each analysis.
Sethuraman et al. (1999, p. 38) state that the observed
cross-price asymmetry in the literature “may simply
be due to the 0 0 0 correlation between price and mar-
ket share across brands.” In addition, Sethuraman
and Srinivasan (2002) find that when controlling
for asymmetric and neighborhood price effects
simultaneously, the coefficient of the price asymmetry
dummy becomes insignificant. Furthermore, private-
label brands are typically less expensive (Hansen
et al. 2006, Sivakumar and Raj 1997) and often smaller
than national brands. Therefore, the usually observed
inferior cross-price elasticities of these brands may
arise (at least partly) from their inherently lower price
and size. Consequently, to ultimately understand
what shapes cross-price effects, all related variables
should be included in one model.
This article broadens the analysis of (moderators
of) cross-brand effects by including consumer and
competitive dynamics and by relating the cross-price
elasticities to all five relevant asymmetric and neigh-
borhood effects at the same time. In our analysis, we
focus on the effect of price promotions—that is, on
the cross-brand price promotional elasticities—while
controlling for changes in regular prices. Literature
has shown that regular price changes and price pro-
motions have different effects on sales (e.g., Bijmolt
et al. 2005, Bucklin and Gupta 1999, Fok et al. 2006,
Srinivasan et al. 2000). To account for this difference,
we decompose actual prices into the regular price and
a price promotion index. We focus on the impact of
price promotions but include the regular price as a
control variable.
To gain insights into the influence of consumer and
competitive dynamics separately, we develop a hier-
archical Bayes vector error correction (VEC) model
and vector autoregressive model with explanatory
variables (VARX) (hereafter, a HB-VEC-VARX model),
which distinguish among immediate, dynamic con-
sumer, and dynamic competitive cross-price effects.
In other words, we compare cross-price elasticities
across three scenarios: (1) considering only immedi-
ate (short-run) effects (immediate effects), (2) consider-
ing also dynamic consumer responses (gross effects),
and (3) additionally considering dynamic competitive
responses (net effects). We base our analysis regard-
ing the second and the third points on the cumula-
tive effects (the sum of immediate and subsequent
dynamic effects), which is common practice in the
dynamic sales response literature (see, e.g., Dekimpe
et al. 1999, Fok et al. 2006, Horváth et al. 2005,
Pauwels et al. 2002). Comparisons across the sce-
narios reveal how consumer dynamics (i.e., preemp-
tive brand switching) and competitive reactions shape
cross-price effects.
To understand how asymmetric and neighborhood
effects influence cross-price promotional elasticities in
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such a dynamic context, we relate the cross-price elas-
ticities to all relevant asymmetric and neighborhood
effects in the second level of our model. These con-
tain asymmetric price and share effects, neighborhood
price and share effects, and national brand/private
label asymmetries. We also control for the influence
of brand- and category-specific variables.
In summary, we contribute to the literature in two
major ways. First, we explore the impact of consumer
and competitive dynamics on cross-price promotional
elasticities. Second, we analyze the relative influences
of a broad set of variables. We address the following
important questions: Does preemptive switching as a
result of price promotions occur, and does this result
in cross-brand post-promotional dips? Are the find-
ings on asymmetric and neighborhood effects robust
to a more realistic dynamic setting? How do con-
sumer and competitive dynamics alter the relative
influence of asymmetric and neighborhood effects?
Do the asymmetric and neighborhood effects prevail
when simultaneously considered in one model, or
does one effect dominate?
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
investigate cross-price elasticities in both a compre-
hensive and dynamic framework. We substantiate this
claim in Table 1, in which we summarize the literature
on cross-price effects.
Analyzing cross-price effects in a realistic, dynamic
context is essential for both researchers and man-
agers. Doing so can offer new insights for researchers
who use cross-price elasticities to examine competi-
tion, pricing, and substitution patterns. Furthermore,
managers can use cross-price elasticities to formulate
important tactical and strategic decisions about price
and market segmentation and to gain insight into
market structures. Conversely, managers who focus
only on short-term cross-price elasticities and ignore
the dynamic environment may make inadequate deci-
sions that could seriously hamper the company in the
future.
Table 1 Articles on Factors That Explain Heterogeneity in Cross-Price Elasticities
Dynamic consumer Competitive reactions
Factor Related article(s) responses considered? explicitly considered?
Asymmetric price (quality) effect Allenby and Rossi (1991), Allenby et al. (2010), Agarwal (2002),
Blattberg and Wisniewski (1989), Bronnenberg and Wathieu (1996),
Kamakura and Russell (1989), Sethuraman et al. (1999), Sivakumar
and Raj (1997), Sivakumar (2004), Wedel and Zhang (2004)
No No
Neighborhood effect Sethuraman et al. (1999), Sivakumar (2000, 2003) No No
Asymmetric size effect Chintagunta (1993), Kamakura and Russell (1989), Sethuraman (1995),
Sethuraman and Srinivasan (2002)
No No
National brand vs. private label Aggarwal and Cha (1998), Agarwal (2002), Raju et al. (1995), Sayman
et al. (2002), Sethuraman (1995), Sethuraman et al. (1999),
Sethuraman and Srinivasan (2002), Sivakumar (2007)
No No
Number of brands in category Sethuraman and Srinivasan (2002), Sethuraman (2009) No No
Food/nonfood categories Sethuraman and Srinivasan (2002) No No
Our main findings are that (1) preemptive switch-
ing does occur, i.e., a brand’s promotion in period t
hurts a competitor’s sales in subsequent periods;
(2) national brand/private label asymmetry is the
most dominant form of asymmetry; (3) competitive
reactions accumulate rather than diminish cross-price
elasticities; and (4) the results on the asymmetric and
neighborhood effects hold even if they are jointly
included in a model and even when we integrate con-
sumer and competitive dynamics. Our findings are
based on an extensive data set. To attain generalizable
results, we analyze 33 categories in five stores (i.e.,
165 store/category combinations).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.
In §2, we outline our conceptual research frame-
work and derive hypotheses from extant literature.
We specify the models in §3, and we present the data
and results in §4. We conclude with a discussion in §5.
2. Conceptual Model and
Literature Review
We depict the conceptual framework that guides our
research in Figure 1. We call the brand whose sales
are affected by the price promotion of another brand
the victim brand in our framework and the promoted
brand the attacker brand. We focus on the immediate,
gross, and net effects of price promotions of brand A
(attacker) on the sales of a rival brand V (victim), in
relation to variables that describe the relative posi-
tioning of the two involved brands, brand variables,
and category variables. In addition, because the two
brands’ cross-price promotional elasticities may be
dependent not only on their relative price and size
positioning but also on their absolute size and price
level, we use average price and size levels of the two
brands as control variables.
For each variable, we summarize the relevant lit-
erature and, if possible, provide a hypothesis for the
expected moderating effect. In many cases, especially
for the complex net effect, we cannot formulate such
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Figure 1 Conceptual Research Framework
Covariates
Price promotion of brand A
Asymmetric and neighborhood effects
• Asymmetric price effect
• Neighborhood price effect
• Asymmetric share effect
• Neighborhood share effect
• Private label/national brand asymmetry
Brand factors
• Frequency of promotions of brands A and V
• Depth of promotions of A and V
• Frequency of features of A and V
• Frequency of displays of A and V
• Average price and size
Category factors
• Perishable
• Utilitarian
• Average budget share
• Competitive concentration
• Interpurchase time
Gross effects on sales of brand V
(immediate effect + dynamic consumer response)
Short-term effects on sales of brand V
(only immediate effect)
Net effects on sales of brand V
(immediate effect + dynamic consumer response
+ competitive reactions)
Note. A refers to the attacker and V to the victim brand.
hypotheses from existing literature, so our investiga-
tions in these cases represent a search for empirical
evidence on the relationship between the considered
characteristics and the (dynamic) effects of price. For
each moderating variable, we first discuss its influ-
ence on the immediate cross-price elasticities. Then,
we review the literature on consumer dynamics, and
finally, on competitive reactions. Last, we summarize
the derived hypotheses for moderation of the imme-
diate, gross, and net effects.
2.1. Asymmetric and Neighborhood Effects
Asymmetric price effect: The asymmetric price effect
states that “a price promotion by a higher-priced
brand affects the share of a lower-priced brand
more so than the reverse” (Sethuraman et al. 1999,
p. 23). Several phenomena contribute to the asym-
metric price effect. First, higher-priced brands are
believed to offer better quality. Price promotions
make these brands affordable to price-conscious con-
sumers who usually buy cheaper brands that are
also of lower quality, and thus these customers are
highly inclined to substitute for their standard pur-
chase. A less expensive brand on promotion offers
lower gained value, so consumers should be less
likely to switch to them (Allenby and Rossi 1991,
Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989, Sethuraman et al.
1999). Second, asymmetry can arise from differ-
ences in the customer base, such that high-quality
(high-priced) brands usually have more loyal cus-
tomers than low-quality (inexpensive) brands. This
distinction contributes further to the greater substitu-
tion effect for the better-quality brand.
Neighborhood price effect: According to the neighbor-
hood price effect hypothesis, brands with prices closer
to one another experience larger cross-price effects
than brands with more dissimilar prices. Kamakura
and Russell (1989) show specifically that consumers
tend to switch only among brands within a certain
price range. Rao (1991), Russel (1992), Sethuraman
(1995), and Sethuraman et al. (1999) also find
additional empirical evidence on the neighborhood
effect.
Consumers are more inclined to accelerate their
purchase and stockpile the discounted brand if it is
better than (asymmetric price effect) or more similar
to (neighborhood price effect) their regular brand pur-
chase. In addition, managers often restrict their atten-
tion to a subset of competitors (DeChernatony and
Johnson 1993, Leeflang and Wittink 1996) and focus
mainly on the competitors with similar positioning
and similar price levels that are likely to serve a sim-
ilar consumer base.
Overall, if the attacker is priced higher than the
victim brand or if the two brands’ prices are simi-
lar, the immediate cross-price effect should be greater.
We also expect asymmetric and neighborhood price
effects to gain strength when we consider dynamic
consumer responses. Finally, in these cases we also
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expect more intense competitive reactions from the
victim brand, so the aggregate outcome of the two
effects on the net cross-price elasticities depends on
the relative magnitude of consumer responses and
competitive reactions.
Asymmetric share effect: Because of their popular-
ity, high awareness, and brand salience, larger brands
have greater drawing power in general (Hauser
and Wernerfelt 1989, Kamakura and Russell 1989,
Rao and Miller 1975), and smaller brands tend to
attract less loyalty from their buyers (Ehrenberg et al.
1990, Martin 1973). This asymmetric share effect phe-
nomenon (Kamakura and Russell 1989, Pauwels 2007,
Sethuraman 1995) implies that large brands’ pro-
motions hurt smaller brands while being less vul-
nerable to smaller brands’ discounts. Because these
larger brands usually also offer higher quality, stock-
piling is more beneficial for customers, so competi-
tors may suffer a further decrease in sales in future
periods. Larger attacker brands also operate through
broader distribution channels and have larger and
more noticeable shelf space (Reibstein and Farris 1995,
Steenkamp et al. 2005). Therefore, they are more
visible not only to customers but also to competi-
tors (Gatignon et al. 1997). Furthermore, if the mar-
ket activities of powerful brands are perceived as
threatening, the smaller, more flexible brands might
respond quickly and easily. In addition, Dolan and
Jeuland (1981) find that large firms tend to avoid price
competition. Thus, price changes by larger brands
likely induce stronger reactions among competitors
(Dutton and Jackson 1987, Gatignon et al. 1997).
Steenkamp et al. (2005, p. 46) offer empirical con-
firmation that “the more powerful the attacker, the
greater the price promotion reaction elasticity.” On
the whole, a larger attacker and a smaller victim
brand should face an increased immediate cross-price
effect. Furthermore, we expect these effects to be even
stronger for the gross cross-price effect. We also antic-
ipate stronger competitive reactions, which prevents
us from formulating the expected moderation for the
net effect.
Neighborhood share effect: Analogous to the neigh-
borhood price effect, we include a variable that cap-
tures the neighborhood share effect. By doing so,
we explore whether brands with similar sizes expe-
rience larger cross-price effects than brands with
more dissimilar sizes. This phenomenon is called
the neighborhood share effect. Larger brands, with
a broader customer base, brand equity, and brand
salience, probably attract brand-conscious customers,
whereas smaller brands attract less brand-conscious
but more price-conscious people. Brand-conscious
customers are more likely to switch to another high-
equity brand, whereas price-conscious customers may
switch to similar cheap brands and may even stock-
pile when they are on sale. The customer base of
brands with similar sizes is usually also similar.
Therefore, brand managers likely consider brands of
similar sizes more threatening than brands of differ-
ent size and therefore are more inclined to react. Thus,
we expect greater immediate cross-price promotional
elasticity, an even greater gross effect, and an intensi-
fied competition between brands with similar sizes.
National brand/private label asymmetry: According
to the national brand/private label asymmetry
hypothesis, national brands steal significant shares
from private labels when they reduce their prices,
whereas promotion-based share gains for private
labels are rather insignificant (Aggarwal and Cha
1998, Blattberg and Neslin 1989). This is largely due
to the more price-sensitive (Aggarwal and Cha 1998,
Ailawadi et al. 2001), less brand-conscious (Ailawadi
et al. 2008), and less loyal (Sethuraman et al. 1999)
customer base of private labels. In general, pri-
vate labels are cheaper than national brands, which
has several implications for their performance. First,
because low price may be attributed to some prob-
lematic aspect of a product, private labels may be per-
ceived as inferior (Garretson et al. 2002) and of lower
quality (Sivakumar and Raj 1997). Second, research
has shown that heavy private label users have lower
income (Dhar and Hoch 1997). This suggests that the
main motivation of customers for purchasing private
labels is their lower price. In line with this, accord-
ing to Bartha and Sinha (2000) and Rothe and Lamont
(1973), price consciousness is a predictor of private
label usage. Finally, private labels can usually spend
less money on advertising, and thus they have lower
brand equity (Sivakumar and Raj 1997) than national
brands.
Because of the differences between national brands
and private labels, price promotions of national
brands offer better switching incentives (both imme-
diate and preemptive switching) than those of pri-
vate labels. Private label customers also tend to be
less loyal and thus more inclined to switch away if a
national brand is for sale than the other way around.
The perceived quality advantage should be particu-
larly high when the attacker is a national brand and
the victim is a private label, moderate if both brands
are national brands, and low if the attacker is a private
label and the victim is a national brand. The imme-
diate and gross effects should similarly decrease if
the quality advantage decreases. Competitive moves
by national brands with broad market channels likely
seem more threatening to a private label than the
other way around. Moreover, national brands are less
likely to retaliate against private labels, because they
“have much to gain from the collaborative relation
with retailers” (Steenkamp et al. 2005, p. 38), and
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their ability to react is restricted (Steenkamp et al.
2005). Yet, because the retailer exerts significant con-
trol over marketing activities, it may also feel less
threatened by national brand promotions. The retailer
has an incentive to maximize store performance, not
just private label sales. Therefore, we recognize that
private labels might not initiate strong competitive
responses to national brand promotions. Considering
these opposing forces, we remain uncertain about the
overall effect of competitive dynamics.
2.2. Other Covariates
2.2.1. Brand-Specific Characteristics. At the
brand level, we distinguish between the activities of
the attacker and the victim brands; thus, we develop
hypotheses for both.
Frequency of price promotions: Frequent price pro-
motions erode brand equity and may convey a
low-quality brand image (Yoo et al. 2000). Thus,
price discounts by a frequent promoter should be
less attractive than discounts by similar brands that
undertake infrequent promotions and thereby stimu-
late less brand switching and less stockpiling behav-
ior. Similarly, frequent discounts by the victim brand
can lower its perceived quality, and so its market
share should respond more to competitors’ price dis-
counts (see also Fok et al. 2006). The frequently
promoted brands then draw a larger proportion of
price-sensitive customers (Zenor et al. 1998), who are
likely to switch when competitive brands are on sale.
Because the frequent promotions also make brands
more noticeable to competitors, they increase the like-
lihood of reaction. The magnitude of marketing activ-
ities in a retail store could also reflect the power
and importance of the brand for the retailer. Overall,
we expect the frequency of price promotions by the
attacker brand to reduce and that by the victim brand
to increase the immediate cross-brand price elasticity.
We also expect these influences to hold for the gross
and net effects.
Average depth of promotions: Consumers often sus-
pect that deep discounts indicate low quality (Jedidi
et al. 1999, Mela et al. 1998) or unjustly high mar-
gins. If the perceived quality of the attacker is low,
cross-price elasticities should be small. A low per-
ceived quality of the victim should have the oppo-
site effect. Furthermore, deep price promotions by
the attacker brand offer a high financial incentive to
buy additional items and stockpile, which can result
in a prolonged sales dip for the victim brand. Our
expectations for the competitive responses are simi-
lar to those for the frequency of promotions. There-
fore, in general, deep discounts by the attacker should
decrease the immediate effect, and those of the victim
brand should increase this effect. These expectations
should also apply to the net and gross effects.
Frequency of feature and display activities: Features
and displays often help increase or maintain brand
awareness. The frequency of such feature and display
activities should increase the likelihood of a brand
appearing in consumers’ consideration set (Keller
1993), which enables consumers to notice its price pro-
motions. However, frequent marketing activity also
draws competitors’ attention and stimulates them
to react. The frequency of marketing activities also
reflects the power and importance of the brand
for the retailer. In summary, price promotions by
an attacker brand that engages in frequent display
or feature activities should have high immediate
and gross cross-price promotional elasticities, but the
more intense competitive reaction may erode some
effects, leaving the moderating influence on the net
effect unclear. We cannot formulate similar hypothe-
ses for the immediate and gross effects of frequent
features and displays by the victim brand. However,
we expect that a victim brand with more frequent dis-
play or feature activities reacts more intensively.
Average price and size: Previous research suggests
that “successful brands with a large customer fran-
chise are 0 0 0 likely to have adopted marketing strate-
gies aimed at retaining their customers” (Raj 1985,
p. 54) and that the perceived higher quality of larger
and higher-priced brands leads to more loyalty and,
thus, less brand switching. Greater loyalty also pre-
vents customers from stockpiling a competing brand
when it is on sale. In line with these arguments, we
expect the brands with higher prices and sizes to
have lower immediate and gross cross effects, though
formulating similar hypotheses for the net effect is
difficult.
2.2.2. Category-Specific Characteristics.
Perishability: The perishable nature of a product cat-
egory is an important feature with regard to the own-
price effects (Fok et al. 2006, Narasimhan et al. 1996,
Raju 1992). In a category with nonperishable prod-
ucts, a large part of the own-price effect may arise
from brand switchers with a high propensity to stock-
pile. This leads to more preemptive brand switching
(Ailawadi et al. 2007). In addition, in less perishable
categories, the victim brand has a greater incentive
to retaliate quickly to price promotions (Steenkamp
et al. 2005). Therefore, we expect stronger immediate
and gross effects in less perishable categories. Again,
the competitive reaction may counterbalance the gross
effect.
Utilitarian nature: Shoppers with relatively low
incomes constitute a relatively large proportion of
the consumer population for necessity goods (Bell
et al. 1999, Wakefield and Inman 2003). This group
is more price sensitive and prone to deals. Further-
more, in low-involvement categories, brand aware-
ness may be a sufficient condition for brand choice
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(Keller 1993). Accordingly, we predict more brand
switching and larger cross-brand price effects in more
utilitarian categories. Moreover, impulse purchases
generally involve hedonic categories. Steenkamp et al.
(2005) find that victim brands are more prone to
react aggressively to promotions in categories open
to impulse purchases, so the lower expected competi-
tive reaction in utilitarian categories may increase the
cross-price effect.
Average budget share: The average budget share of a
category measures the category’s financial importance
to the consumer. Consumers tend to react strongly to
promotions in categories that take up a large part of
the budget (Fok et al. 2006, Macé and Neslin 2004).
Therefore, we expect the immediate cross-price effect
to be large in such categories. We also expect con-
sumers to stockpile the product to take maximum
advantage of the discount. Finally, we expect competi-
tors to react strongly to promotions in a high-budget
category because of the high financial stakes. In turn,
this leads to a high immediate effect and a high gross
effect in a large-budget category. It is not possible to
offer a hypothesis for the net effect.
Competitive concentration: In the presence of several
similar brands, which implies low competitive con-
centration, brand switching is a dominant source of
variability in brand sales (Narasimhan et al. 1996,
Raju 1992). Conversely, many competitors can also
imply more differentiation, such that brands are less
exposed to competitors’ actions or brand switch-
ing (Ailawadi et al. 2007, Macé and Neslin 2004).
Sethuraman et al. (1999) also conclude that cross-price
Table 2 Hypotheses on Moderating Factors for Cross-Price Elasticities
Variable Immediate effect Gross effect Net effect
Asymmetric price effect (Price A > Price V) + + ?
Neighborhood price effect Price A − Price V − − ?
Asymmetric share effect (Share A > Share V) + + ?
Neighborhood share effect Share A − Share V − − ?
National brand (A) vs. private label (V)a + + ?
Private label (A) vs. national brand (V)a − − ?
Average price − − ?
Average size − − ?
V’s relative price promotion frequency + + +
V’s relative depth of price promotions + + +
V’s relative feature and display frequency ? ? ?
A’s relative price promotion frequency − − −
A’s relative depth of price promotions − − −
A’s relative feature and display frequency + + +
Perishability − − ?
Utilitarian + + ?
Budget share (avg) + + ?
Competitive concentration + + +
Interpurchase time − − ?
aThe markets in our data contain one private label maximum, so there are no private label/private label pairs. We choose national/national brand pairs as
the base for the private label/national brand asymmetry. The national brand (A) vs. private label (V) variable measures whether the effect of a promotion by a
national brand on a private label differs from this base. The private label (A) vs. national brand (V) variable can be interpreted accordingly.
effects are stronger when there are fewer competing
brands in the product category. Regarding competi-
tive reactions, Steenkamp et al. (2005) recognize that
in concentrated markets, margins may be high, and
firms might be reluctant to diminish these by get-
ting involved in a price war. Ramaswamy et al. (1994)
also find that market concentration has a negative
impact on the likelihood of price retaliation. Over-
all, we expect immediate, gross, and net cross-brand
elasticities to be greater in more concentrated mar-
kets. However, because competitive reactions are less
likely, we cannot form a hypothesis about the net
price elasticity.
Interpurchase time: Consumers trade off the lower
cost of the promoted brand against the substitution
cost of buying a less-preferred brand. This cost is not
severe in product categories with a short interpur-
chase time, because the consumer only needs to live
with the consequences of his or her decision for a
short period and then can switch back to the pre-
ferred brand. Therefore, shorter interpurchase times
should be associated with increased brand switch-
ing caused by promotion (Bawa and Shoemaker 1987,
Narasimhan et al. 1996). Furthermore, interpurchase
times may be related to purchase acceleration. In par-
ticular, long interpurchase times discourage acceler-
ation because the stockpiled product must be stored
for a longer period, which increases the consumer’s
cost of stockpiling (Blattberg et al. 1981). Finally, in
categories with higher immediate brand switching,
competing brands will be more motivated to retaliate
(Steenkamp et al. 2005). Thus, we expect categories
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with shorter consumer interpurchase times to face
more brand switching and, therefore, increased imme-
diate and gross effects. However, the increased com-
petitive reactions likely lead to a lower net effect.
Whether the effect in the end is positive or negative
depends on the reaction intensity of the competitors.
An overall summary of our hypotheses appears in
Table 2. Note that in all cases, we expect the same
sign for the moderation parameters with respect to
the immediate and gross effect. This is because con-
sumer dynamics seem to magnify the moderation of
all variables in all cases. Competitive dynamics, how-
ever, work against these effects in most cases. Thus,
if the competitive reactions are strong enough, they
may cancel the moderation effects or even turn them
around. This uncertainty is indicated by the question
marks in Table 2.
3. Methodology
Measuring the impact of moderating variables on the
immediate, gross, and net effects of price promotions
requires multiple models. Immediate and gross effects
only pertain to consumer behavior, so we can mea-
sure them using VEC models for sales, conditional
on current and lagged prices. To measure the net
effect, which also depends on competitive reactions,
we also specify VARX models for promotional prices,
using lagged sales and lagged promotional prices as
explanatory variables. In other words, we model sales
and price promotional decisions jointly by specify-
ing the conditional distribution of sales given prices
and the marginal distribution of prices. To connect
the cross-price promotional effects with moderating
variables, we jointly consider the models for all prod-
uct categories in a hierarchical Bayes fashion. The
combination of the models yields our HB-VEC-VARX
model.
Cross-price promotional effects are difficult to esti-
mate and thus are often insignificant. Therefore, we
measure cross-price promotional elasticities in a large
number of product categories in five different stores.
Note that across stores, different brands may make up
a category, and the positioning of the same brand may
differ across stores. Therefore, we treat the categories
and their brands in the different stores independently.
This approach allows us to connect the moderating
factors with a broad sample of cross-price elasticities,
thereby improving the generalizability and robustness
of our results.
Our model extends the models of Fok et al.
(2006) and Van Heerde et al. (2007) in several ways.
Van Heerde et al. (2007) examine (time-varying)
baseline sales and focus on own and cross effects in
one specific market. Fok et al. (2006), whose model
is the closest to our approach, only use a conditional
model for sales given prices, whereas our model also
specifies the marginal model for prices—that is, a set
of competitive reaction equations. Furthermore, Fok
et al. explicitly focus on own-price effects, whereas
we analyze cross-price effects. This requires a major
change in the structure of the second-level model.
Finally, whereas Fok et al. (2006) use information from
one store, we combine data across several stores to
establish generalizable and robust results.
3.1. First-Level Model: Measuring Cross-Price
Promotional Effects
In the first level of our model, we specify a
multivariate model for all brands in each store and
each category. To simplify the notation, we do not
explicitly distinguish between stores; thus we use the
word “category” to refer to a store-category combi-
nation. Let C be the total number of store-category
combinations, and let Ic denote the number of brands
in category c, where c = 11 0 0 0 1C. Next, let Sct and
Pct denote Ic-dimensional vectors of sales and promo-
tional prices1 for category c in week t.
We first specify a model for Sct conditional on Pct .
Then, we set up the model for Pct . Explanatory vari-
ables other than the promotional price are collected
in the Ic-dimensional vectors Xckt , each containing the
kth set of (marketing-mix) variables for the brands in
category c in week t, k= 11 0 0 0 1K. Note that these vec-
tors also contain regular price variables. For this part
of the model, we follow Fok et al. (2006) and spec-
ify the following VEC model to explain sales, condi-
tional on promotional prices, for category c (see also
Van Heerde et al. 2007, 2010):
ãlogSct
=c+AcãlogPct+
K∑
k=1
A∗ckãXckt
+ç1c
(
logSc1t−1 −Bc logPc1t−1 −
K∑
k=1
B∗ckXck1t−1
)
+ct1 (1)
where ct ∼ N401èc5, for c = 11 0 0 0 1C1 t = 11 0 0 0 1 Tc,
and ã is the first difference operator (for example,
ãXckt = Xckt − Xck1 t−1). The matrix ç1c measures the
speed of adjustment of sales to the long-run steady
state. The sales are stationary if the eigenvalues of
I +ç1c are within the unit circle, where I denotes a
unit matrix.2 The matrices Ac and Bc contain own- and
1 The promotional price refers to the actual price divided by the
regular price.
2 Previous research (e.g., Fok et al. 2006, Horváth et al. 2005, Nijs
et al. 2001, Pauwels et al. 2002) has shown that most sales series
are (trend) stationary, after correcting for possible seasonality and
possible breaks as a result of changes in the regular price series.
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cross-brand price effects, with the own effects as diag-
onal and the cross effects as off-diagonal elements.
The element of Ac in row i and column j , denoted by
Aij1 c, corresponds to the effect of a price promotion
by brand j on brand i’s sales in category c. Finally, c
is a vector of intercepts.
To capture competitive reactions, we augment this
model with a marginal model for price, given only
lagged information. To this end, we specify a VARX
model for promotional prices; that is, for category c,
logPct = c + 4I +ç2c5 logPc1 t−1 +Dc log Sc1 t−1
+
K∑
k=1
D∗ckXk1 ct + ct1 (2)
where ct ∼ N401ìc5. Competitive reactions are con-
tained in the matrices ç2c and Dc; that is, the cur-
rent price of a brand may depend on lagged sales or
lagged prices of another brand.3 Conditional on sales
and the additional explanatory variables, this model
has stationary price paths, as long as the eigenvalues
of I+ç2c are within the unit circle. To match the VEC
model for sales, we rewrite this model as
ã logPct = c +ç2c logPc1 t−1 +Dc log Sc1 t−1
+
K∑
k=1
D∗ckXk1 ct + ct0 (3)
Although this model is specified for price changes,
that does not mean that prices are nonstationary. The
model in Equation (3) is completely equivalent to that
in Equation (2). Because Equation (3) is the marginal
model for prices, the error ct by construction is inde-
pendent of ct .
The models in Equations (1) and (3) together spec-
ify the joint model of sales and promotional prices.
We write them jointly as(
I −Ac
0 I
)(
ã log Sct
ã logPct
)
=
(
c
c
)
+
(
ç1c −ç1cBc
Dc ç2c
)
·
(
log Sc1 t−1
logPc1 t−1
)
+
(
ct
ct
)
1 (4)
3 Note that we exclude the possibility of immediate reactions.
In theory, such reactions may be possible for a private label:
the retailer knows prices and may adapt the private label’s price
according to competing promotions. If such reactions occur, they
will be reflected in the covariance matrix ìc . For the empirical anal-
ysis, we inspected these matrices and can conclude that direct reac-
tions by the private label are not present in our data. This finding is
confirmed by a direct analysis of the contemporaneous correlation
between prices. We find that if one brand is for sale, another one
is less likely to be promoted in the same period as well. This is in
line with the idea of an alternating promotional schedule described
in Lal (1990) and Rao et al. (1995).
where, for notational convenience, we omit the exoge-
nous variables (Xkct). This system of equations can be
solved to give(
log Sct
logPct
)
=
(
c +Acc
c
)
+
(
I +ç1c +AcDc Acç2c −ç1cBc
Dc I +ç2c
)
·
(
log Sc1 t−1
logPc1 t−1
)
+
(
I Ac
0 I
)(
ct
ct
)
0 (5)
3.2. Immediate, Gross, and Net Effects
To obtain the immediate and gross effects of a price
promotion, we need only to consider Equation (1).
It is relatively straightforward to show that Aij1 c can
be interpreted as the immediate effect, or immediate
price elasticity, of brand j on brand i. More formally,
¡Sict
¡Pjct
Pjct
Sict
= ¡ log Sict
¡ logPjct
=Aij1 c0 (6)
The parameter Bij1 c refers to the (cumulative) gross
effect of a price promotion of brand j on the present
and future sales of brand i, assuming that future
prices are not affected by the promotion. In terms of
partial effects or elasticities, the gross effect equals
∑
=0
¡Sic1 t+
¡Pjct
Pjct
Sic1 t+
=
∑
=0
¡ log Sic1 t+
¡ logPjct
= Bij1 c1 (7)
and Fok et al. (2006) provide the derivation.
The derivation of the net effect is more compli-
cated. Because it measures the cumulative immediate
and dynamic responses of consumers and competitors
to a price promotion, we need the complete model
in Equation (5). In this formulation, a price promo-
tion is equivalent to an unexpected change in price
at time t—that is, a shock to prices through ct . The
immediate impact of such a shock is ct for prices and
Acct for sales; that is, a shock of size 1 to the log price
of brand j leads to a change of size Aij1 c in the log
sales of brand i (see also Equation (6)). The size of the
impact of this shock on sales and prices at time t+ 
is given by(
I +ç1c +AcDc Acç2c −ç1cBc
Dc I +ç2c
) (
Ac
I
)
ct0 (8)
The (cumulative) net effect is therefore
∑
=0
(
I +ç1c +AcDc Acç2c −ç1cBc
Dc I +ç2c
) (
Ac
I
)
ct
=
[
I−
(
I+ç1c+AcDc Acç2c−ç1cBc
Dc I+ç2c
)]−1(
Ac
I
)
ct
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=
(−ç1c −AcDc ç1cBc −Acç2c
−Dc −ç2c
)−1(
Ac
I
)
ct
= âcct0 (9)
The first equality holds only if the complete sys-
tem in Equation (5) is stationary. Otherwise, the net
effects are equal to plus or minus infinity. Under the
assumption of stationarity, the matrix âc exists and
is of dimension 2Ic × Ic. The upper Ic × Ic block of
this matrix (denoted by â 4s5c ) contains the total sales
responses to an initial price promotion. The lower
Ic × Ic block (denoted by â 4p5c ) contains the total price
responses. More precisely, the 4i1 j5 element of â 4s5c
(denoted by â 4s5ij1 c) measures the sum of sales responses
by brand i over time to the initial price promotion
of brand j , and â 4p5ij1 c gives the cumulative reactions in
the price of brand i due to a promotion by i. There-
fore, the net cross-price effects are the off-diagonal
elements of â 4s5c .
3.3. Second-Level Model: Relating the Cross-Price
Promotional Effects to Moderating Variables
Our main interest is in the cross effects, so for nota-
tional efficiency, we collect all cross-price effects for
category c in Ic · 4Ic − 15-dimensional vectors. The
cross-effect elements from Ac are collected in ˜c, the
elements from Bc in ˜c, and the elements from â
4s5
c in
˜c. More precisely,
˜c = 4A121 c1A131 c1 0 0 0 1A1Ic1 c1A211 c1A231 c1 0 0 0 1
A2Ic1 c1 0 0 0 1AIc11 c1AIc21 c1 0 0 0 1AIc1 Ic−11 c5
′
˜c = 4B121 c1B131 c1 0 0 0 1B1Ic1 c1B211 c1B231 c1 0 0 0 1
B2Ic1 c1 0 0 0 1BIc11 c1BIc21 c1 0 0 0 1BIc1 Ic−11 c5
′ (10)
˜c = 4â 4s5121 c1â 4s5131 c1 0 0 0 1 â 4s51Ic1 c1â
4s5
211 c1â
4s5
231 c1 0 0 0 1
â
4s5
2Ic1 c
1 0 0 0 1 â
4s5
Ic11 c
1â
4s5
Ic21 c
1 0 0 0 1 â
4s5
Ic1 Ic−11 c5
′0
Therefore, ˜c captures all the immediate effects, ˜c all
the gross effects, and ˜c all the net cross-brand price
promotional effects in category c. Finally, we intro-
duce two functions, i4l5 and j4l5, that map the index
of an element of ˜c, ˜c, or ˜c to the index of the vic-
tim and attacker brands, respectively. For example,
i425= 1 and j425= 3, so the second elasticity in ˜c cor-
responds to the cross elasticity of brand 3 on brand 1,
as specified in Equation (11).
Differences in the immediate, gross, and net elas-
ticities across brand pairs can partly be attributed to
observable characteristics, such as store effects, asym-
metry effects, neighborhood effects, and brand- and
category-specific variables. Therefore, to describe the
immediate, gross, and net elasticity parameters for
promotional price, we use
˜l1 c = 4150 + 4151
′
zi4l51 c + 4152
′
zj4l51 c + 4153
′
g4zi4l51 c1 zj4l51 c5
+ 4154
′
zc + 4155
′
dc +415lc 1 (11)
˜l1 c = 4250 + 4251
′
zi4l51 c + 4252
′
zj4l51 c + 4253
′
g4zi4l51 c1 zj4l51 c5
+ 4254
′
zc + 4255
′
dc +425lc 1 (12)
˜l1 c = 4350 + 4351
′
zi4l51 c + 4352
′
zj4l51 c + 4353
′
g4zi4l51 c1 zj4l51 c5
+ 4354
′
zc + 4355
′
dc +435lc 1 (13)
where zc contains variables on the category level, for
example, the competitive concentration of the cate-
gory; and zi1 c is a vector of characteristics of brand i
in category c. The use of the two mapping functions
i4l5 and j4l5 leads to a model in which the character-
istics of both the attacker brand (zj4l51 c) and the vic-
tim brand (zi4l51 c) are included. The vector dc contains
dummy variables for the different stores. The neigh-
borhood and asymmetric price and sales effects are
captured by the function g4 5. In the empirical analy-
sis that follows, g4 5 includes the absolute difference
in the overall price level between the attacker and the
victim, the absolute difference in their sizes, indicators
of whether the attacker brand is larger or more expen-
sive than the victim brand, and the average price and
share of the two brands. The parameter vectors 415n ,

425
n , and 
435
n , n = 11 0 0 0 15, describe the effects of all
characteristics on the immediate and dynamic elastic-
ities, where the superscript refers to one of the three
effects (immediate, net, or cumulative) and the sub-
script refers to one of the five model components. For
the error terms 415l1 c, 
425
l1 c, and 
435
l1 c, we assume inde-
pendent normal distributions.
3.4. Estimation
To estimate the parameters of our model, we consider
a Bayesian approach using Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) sampling. A complete Bayesian approach is
not feasible, because the net effect constitutes a highly
nonlinear combination of many parameters (see Equa-
tion (9)). Therefore, we propose another strategy that
leads to unbiased estimates. We first obtain posterior
draws for the sales and price models for all categories
in the first layer of our model, together with the sec-
ond layer as described in Equations (11) and (12). This
gives a complete picture of the immediate and net
effects and all competitive reactions.
We use the combination of draws from both sets of
models to obtain posterior draws for the net effect,
according to Equation (9). These draws are used to
provide inference on the moderators of the net effect.
In each iteration of the Markov chain for this part of
the model, we take a different draw of the net effects
as the dependent variable to ensure that we properly
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deal with the uncertainty in the net effects. The full
details of the procedure, together with the set of pri-
ors used, appear in Appendix A.
3.5. Simulation Results
To check the performance of our Bayesian sampler,
we test our procedures on simulated data. The simu-
lation design matches our empirical data in size—that
is, in terms of the number of store/category combina-
tions (5 × 33), the number of brands in each category
(five), and the number of observations (five years of
weekly data).
The experiment is as follows.
Step 1. We randomly generate brand and category
characteristics.
Step 2. We randomly generate all own-price effects.
Step 3. We generate all cross-price effects using the
characteristics of the victim and the attacker brand as
specified in Equations (11)–(13).
Step 4. We generate sales and prices for all brands
using the generated own and cross effects and the
generated values for all other coefficients in the mod-
els (see Equation (4)).
Step 5. We calculate the true net cross-price effects
using the generated parameters and Equation (9);
Step 6. We apply our model and estimation proce-
dure as presented previously.
Note that in this simulation, we generate the own-
price effects as a function of the brand characteris-
tics, but in our estimation procedure, we ignore this
dependence. We use our simulation experiment not
only to check the performance of the MCMC algo-
rithm but also to confirm that we can safely ignore
the dependence of own effects on brand and category
characteristics when analyzing the moderating factors
for cross effects.4
In Step 1, we generate two continuous category
variables (e.g., competitive concentration and budget
share), one binary brand variable (e.g., a private label
indicator), and one continuous brand variable (e.g.,
promotional frequency). We generate the continuous
variables from a standard normal distribution. The
binary variable is set to 1 for one of the brands in
each category. The own effects are moderated by all
characteristics; that is, they are generated according to
Aii1 c = 4150 +4151
′
zi1 c +4152
′
zc +  415ic 1
Bii1 c = 4250 +4251
′
zi1 c +4252
′
zc +  425ic 1
(14)
where Aii1 c and Bii1 c are the immediate and gross
own-price effects, respectively, as defined in Equa-
tion (1). The vector zi1 c denotes the characteristics of
4 Intuition indicates that omitting moderators of the own effects
should not bias the results of the moderators of the cross effects.
The simulation results in this section confirm this. We thank a
reviewer for suggesting this point.
brand i in category c, zc denotes a vector of charac-
teristics of category c, and  415ic and 
425
ic are indepen-
dently normal distributed random effects.5 We set the
cross effects such that they depend on the brand char-
acteristics of the victim and the attacker and on the
first category variable. We deliberately set the impact
of the second category variable to 0. This means that
this variable only affects the own-price effects. The
chosen parameter values for these moderating effects
appear in the second column of Table 3. The level
of the variance of the random effect is set to match
our empirical results. The parameter values for the
moderators on the net effect cannot be set directly.
The net effects follow from the immediate and gross
cumulative effects in combination with the competi-
tive reactions (see Equation (9)). Therefore, the impact
of the moderators on the net effects is a result of the
chosen values for the other parameters. We obtain the
reported true values for the net effect in Table 3 by
regressing the true cross-price net effects on the mod-
erating variables.
Table 3 also shows the posterior means, poste-
rior standard deviations, and 90% highest posterior
density (HPD) regions for all cross-price parameters,
obtained using our Bayesian procedure. It is clear that
parameter recovery is excellent. All posterior means
are close to the true values, and for almost all param-
eters, the true value is contained in the 90% HPD
region. Thus, ignoring the impact of the moderators
on the own effects does not lead to a bias in the
cross effects. Moreover, although the second-category
variable only affects the own-price effects, we do not
spuriously find a moderating effect of this variable on
the cross effects.
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Data and Variables
For our empirical analysis, we use data on five
stores, gathered from the recently released Informa-
tion Resources Inc. (IRI) data set (Bronnenberg et al.
2008). This data set contains five years of data on 31
main product categories across many U.S. supermar-
kets.6 We selected the five stores using the follow-
ing criteria: (1) the size of the store, measured using
5 The chosen parameter values for the immediate own effect are
as follows: intercept, −102; binary brand variable, −002; continuous
category variable 1, 001; continuous category variable 2, −004; and
continuous brand variable, −002. For the cumulative own effects,
we set these parameter values equal to −0075, −001, −001, −002, and
002, respectively.
6 The categories are labeled as follows: beer, blades, carbbev,
cigets, coffee, coldcer, deod, diapers, factiss, fzdinent, fzpizza,
hhclean, hotdog, laundet, margbutr, mayo, milk, mustketc, paptowl,
peanbutr, photo, razors, saltsnck, shamp, soup, spagsauc, sugarsub,
toitisu, toothbr, toothpa, and yogurt.
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Table 3 Estimation Results on Moderators of Cross-Price Effects Using Simulated Data for 165 Markets, Where Each Market Contains Five Brands
(Total of 3,300 Cross Effects)
True valuea Posterior mean Posterior SD 90% HPD region
Immediate cross-promotional price effect
Intercept 001 00099 4000035∗∗∗ 6000941001037
Binary brand variable (V) 001 00102 4000055∗∗∗ 600092100117
Binary brand variable (A) −0015 −00148 4000055∗∗∗ 6−001571−00147
Continuous category variable 1 001 00100 4000035∗∗∗ 6000951001067
Continuous category variable 2 0 −00002 (0.003) 6−000071000027
Continuous brand variable (V) 0005 00050 4000025∗∗∗ 6000471000547
Continuous brand variable (A) −0005 −00048 4000025∗∗∗ 6−000521−000457
Variance of error 0001 00011 4000005∗∗∗ 600011000117
Gross cumulative cross-promotional price effect
Intercept 002 00190 4000045∗∗∗ 6001841001977
Binary brand variable (V) 0015 00151 4000085∗∗∗ 6001381001647
Binary brand variable (A) −001 −00090 4000085∗∗∗ 6−001021−000777
Continuous category variable 1 0015 00148 4000055∗∗∗ 600141001567
Continuous category variable 2 0 −00001 (0.004) 6−000091000067
Continuous brand variable (V) 0005 00053 4000035∗∗∗ 6000481000587
Continuous brand variable (A) −0003 −00028 4000035∗∗∗ 6−000331−000237
Variance of error 0001 00011 4000015∗∗∗ 600011000127
Net cumulative cross-promotional price effect
Intercept 00294 00277 4000095∗∗∗ 6002631002917
Binary brand variable (V) 00194 00190 4000185∗∗∗ 60016100227
Binary brand variable (A) −00155 −00133 4000175∗∗∗ 6−00161−001067
Continuous category variable 1 00216 00213 4000105∗∗∗ 600197100237
Continuous category variable 2 −00003 −00007 (0.009) 6−000221000087
Continuous brand variable (V) 00075 00077 4000075∗∗∗ 6000661000887
Continuous brand variable (A) −00046 −00043 4000065∗∗∗ 6−000541−000337
Variance of error 00061 00090 4000045∗∗∗ 6000831000977
aThe “true values” for the net cumulative effect are not set directly in the simulation design. The reported values are obtained by regressing the true net
cumulative cross-price effects on the moderating variables.
∗∗∗99% HPD regions do not contain zero; ∗∗95% HPD regions do not contain zero; ∗90% HPD regions do not contain zero.
the all commodity volume (we chose average-sized
stores), (2) opening and closing dates (stores opening
or closing during the five years of data are excluded),
(3) sufficient variation in price, and (4) availability of
categories (the stores must have at least two brands
in all product categories). We randomly selected five
stores out of all qualifying stores. The restriction to
“just” five stores is due to computing time and com-
puter memory limitations.
Before aggregating the data to the brand level, we
select the focal stockkeeping units (SKUs). Some of
the IRI-defined categories actually contain different
types of products, whereas we adopt a narrow defi-
nition of product category. For example, the IRI beer
category contains malt beverages, but we ignore all
SKUs that are not strictly beer. Other IRI product cat-
egories can even be split in two; for example, the
IRI mayo category contains data on mayonnaise, salad
dressings, and sandwich spreads; and the sandwich
spread subcategory is large enough to be considered
as a separate category. We also split the carbbev cat-
egory into colas and other soft drinks, fzdinent into
frozen dinners and frozen entrees, and mustketc into
mustards and ketchups. Finally, we ignore the photo
category (photographic film) because the SKUs are
extremely difficult to compare in terms of the num-
ber of photos that correspond to a particular SKU. We
also exclude the milk category because sometimes this
category contains only one brand. In total, we use 33
product categories in five stores.
To aggregate SKU data to the brand level, we use
weights. For example, the display variable we con-
struct denotes the percentage of sales generated by
SKUs on display.7 After aggregation, we delete any
brand with an average market share below 1%. Some
remaining brands lack data for some weeks, and
we use three strategies to deal with these missing
7 This procedure makes the display variable a function of the
dependent variable, thus potentially leading to an endogeneity
problem. However, endogeneity is likely to be limited because the
display variable is actually a function of the SKU shares within a
brand, not the actual sales level of the brand (which is the depen-
dent variable in our sales model). Furthermore, such a weighting
scheme is common in the literature (see, for example, Leeflang and
Wittink 1992, 1996). Some authors opt to have constant weights
for the aggregation of promotions—that is, using average volume
shares over a long time period (Pauwels 2004). For the aggregation
of product-level prices, many authors use brand-level dollar sales
divided by the total volume sales (see, for example, Bronnenberg
et al. 2000). Note that this is equivalent to a volume share-weighted
average of product prices, where the weights vary over time.
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values. First, if the corresponding brand has a mar-
ket share below 5%, we ignore this brand. Second, if
the missing values occur at the start or end of the
observational period, we remove the initial or final
observations for the entire category. Third, we impute
any remaining missing values using time averages.
The final number of brands per category varies from
2 to 11, and the average category contains five brands.
In total, we have 824 brands and 3,950 cross-brand
pairs.
We specify error correction models as in Equa-
tion (1) for the sales, given promotional and regular
prices, display and feature, for each category in each
store.8 For feature and display, we treat all types of
promotions, as defined in the data set, equally. To con-
trol for product introductions or deletions in the cate-
gory, we include the number of unique products sold
by each brand as additional explanatory variables (see
Appendix B for details on how this variable is con-
structed). We also include a trend and, if necessary,
seasonal dummies, similar to Steenkamp et al. (2005).
This method yields 165 error correction models. For
each market we also specify a VARX model for the
prices. For these models, we also use seasonal dum-
mies, a trend, and the number of unique products
sold as additional explanatory variables.
The models are linked by the second-level equa-
tions that describe the price effects. As moderating
factors of the cross-price elasticities, we include the
average price level, defined as the average of the reg-
ular prices of the attacker and the victim, relative
to the category. We also compute neighborhood and
asymmetric price effects on the basis of the average
regular prices relative to the category. The average
share, neighborhood, and asymmetric share effects
are based on the average shares of the attacker and
victim brands. We code the effect of private labels
using two dummy variables equal to 1 if the vic-
tim or the attacker is a private label, respectively.
The frequency of price promotions is the frequency
of weeks in which the promotional price index fell
below 0.9. The average depth of the price promo-
tions reflects the average of the promotional price
index, divided by price promotion frequency. Both
frequency and depth of price promotions are relative
to the market. Experts coded each product category
on perishability and utilitarian nature on seven-point
scales, where 7 means highly perishable or highly
utilitarian.9 To operationalize the budget share, we
calculate the average expenditure in each category. We
8 We adapted the algorithm of Fok et al. (2006) to decompose the
actual price into a regular price variable and a promotional price
index.
9 The scores are not listed to save space, but they are available from
the authors upon request.
measure competitive concentration using an entropy-
based measure equal to the sum over all brands of
the average market share times the log of the average
market share (Raju 1992). We calculate the average
interpurchase time using the household-level scanner
data that also appear in the IRI database. Because the
household-level data are not available for all markets,
we average the interpurchase time over all available
markets. Finally, we include dummy variables to code
the different stores, which permits the overall level of
cross effects to differ across stores. We construct these
dummies such that they indicate the deviation with
respect to the average store; that is, we mean center
these dummies.
To facilitate the comparison of effect sizes, we stan-
dardize all characteristics except the dummy variables
coding the private labels. We perform this standard-
ization before calculating the asymmetry and neigh-
borhood variables.
4.2. Estimation Results
We use the Bayesian procedure outlined in App-
endix A to obtain insight into the parameter values.
The posterior results are based on 100,000 draws, with
the first 50,000 as burn-in. To remove correlation in
the chain, we consider every fifth draw when com-
puting the posterior results.
4.2.1. Convergence. To test the convergence of the
Bayesian procedure, we apply the Geweke (1992)
test to the parameters of the moderating variables.
In total, we have 72 such parameters. For each param-
eter, we compare the posterior mean obtained from
the first part of the draws with the mean from the
final part of the draws. The combination of this test
and visual inspection of convergence plots indicate
parameter convergence.10
4.2.2. Model Fit. Although our model is not pre-
dictive, we can use predictive accuracy to assess its
quality. So, for each brand in each category, we calcu-
late one-step-ahead predictions for log sales and com-
pare the ratio of the variance of these predictions with
the variance in actual log sales. The resulting measure
is comparable to the R2 measure. For approximately
1.2% of all 824 brands, this measure is less than 0.25.
For approximately 8%, it falls between 0.25 and 0.50,
and for approximately 30%, the percentage explained
variance is between 50% and 75%. For the remaining
60%, more than 75% of the variance is explained by
our model. These results signal that our models fit the
product categories well.
4.2.3. First-Level Results: The Cross-Price Pro-
motional Elasticities. In Table 4 and Figure 2, we
summarize the results for all individual cross-price
10 The actual plots are not included for space considerations but are
available from the authors upon request.
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Table 4 Overview of Sign and Significance of the Cross-Promotional Price Effects per Brand Combination (Total 3,950 Cross-Price Effects)
Gross cumulative − Net − Gross
Immediate effect (%) Gross cumulative (%) Net cumulative (%) Immediate (%) cumulative (%)
Negative 20094 17022 24096 39097 41034
Positive 79006 82078 75004 60003 58066
Negative and significant at 99% 0015 0000 0008 0028 0005
Negative and significant at 95%–99% 0020 0018 0038 0046 0038
Negative and significant at 90%–95% 0048 0028 0051 0073 0058
Negative and not significant at 90% 20010 16076 24000 38051 40033
Positive and not significant at 90% 45097 49022 55006 58003 58003
Positive and significant at 90%–95% 6015 7049 6008 1019 0041
Positive and significant at 95%–99% 9077 9059 7016 0053 0018
Positive and significant at 99% 17016 16048 6073 0028 0005
Note. “Significant at x%” should be read as zero is not contained in the x% HPD region.
effects. Most immediate cross-price effects are posi-
tive (i.e., 79% of 3,950 cases), and approximately 33%
are significantly greater than 0 (see Table 4). The few
negative effects are relatively small in size and mostly
insignificant. Note that negative cross-price effects are
present in the literature. A promotion of a brand
might sometimes remind some customers about the
category, and instead of buying the promoted brand,
they buy their strongly preferred, unpromoted brand
(Van Heerde et al. 2003).
Figure 2 Histograms of the Posterior Means of the Cross-Price Effects
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Notes. The horizontal axis for net effects is trimmed to allow for easy comparison. Less than 1.5% of the net cumulative cross-price effects is cut off.
For the gross effects, we find that the number of
negative elasticities decreases when we also account
for consumer dynamics, which also holds for the
number of negative and significant elasticities. For
greater understanding of how consumer dynamics
alters cross-promotional effects, we calculate the per-
centage of cases in which the posterior mean of the
gross effect less the immediate effect is positive (see
the fifth column of Table 4 and Figure 2(d)). We find
that in 60% of the cases, the gross effect is larger
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than the immediate effect. A straightforward sign test
shows that this percentage is significantly different
from 50%, the value that corresponds to an absence
of a cross-brand post-promotion dip. More precisely,
given 3,950 estimated cross effects, the 95% interval
for the percentage of positive findings under the null
hypothesis of no cross-brand dip runs from 48.4%
to 51.57% and does not contain our empirical result
(60%). Overall, our results suggest that promotions
induce customers not only to switch to the discounted
brand but also to stockpile it, depressing future com-
petitive sales.
To understand the importance of the cross-brand
post-promotion dip, we calculated two measures.
First, we calculated the size of the post-promotion
dip relative to the immediate cross effect. Sec-
ond, we calculated the ratio of the average cross-
brand post-promotion dip to the average own-brand
post-promotion dip. In the second calculation, we
corrected for the notion that the two dips were calcu-
lated with respect to different brands and that these
brands may differ in size. We use the ratio of the
average effects across all brands when calculating
both measures. We find that, on average, the cross-
brand post-promotion dip is approximately 13% of
the immediate cross effect. This means that if brand A
takes 100 units away from brand B in the immediate
period, it takes another 13 in future periods. We also
find that, on average, the cross-brand post-promotion
dip is approximately 25% of the own cross-promotion
dip. So if the own-brand post-promotion dip of
brand A is 100 units, the cross-brand post-promotion
dip will be 25.
The histogram of the net effects (Figure 2(c)) shows
an increased dispersion of the cross effects compared
with the distribution of the immediate and gross
effects. This outcome and the reduced number of sig-
nificant elasticities may be due to the increased com-
plexity involved in estimating net effects. The net
effects contain dynamic consumer and competitive
behavior. Therefore, estimation uncertainty may have
a greater impact on the net effect. Moreover, a price
promotion by an attacker brand probably induces sev-
eral competitors to react, so the net effect captures
(possible) competitive reactions from all brands, not
only the specified victim brand. Yet, the majority of the
posterior means remain positive. We find a positive
net impact for approximately 75% of the brand combi-
nations, though of all net cross-price effects, only 20%
are significantly different from 0. To measure the incre-
mental effect of competitive dynamics on cross-brand
effects, we calculate the difference between the net and
gross effects, which is positive in 59% of cases.
Our sign test indicates that this percentage is
also significantly different from 50%. So, in general,
competitive reactions lead to an increase in the
cross effects. At first glance, this is a surprising result,
because we might expect competitors to retaliate
against a promotion to make up for sales losses. How-
ever, the literature provides several potential explana-
tions for this finding. First, both Pauwels (2004) and
Steenkamp et al. (2005) show that competitive reac-
tions are as likely to be accommodating as retalia-
tory. Second, a promotion may induce several brands’
reactions at the same time, and these simultaneous
responses may further reduce the victim’s sales in
future periods. Finally, company inertia or retailer
dynamic support may cause the initial promotion
itself to last for more weeks (Pauwels 2004, 2007).
4.2.4. Second-Level Results: Moderating Factors
of Cross-Brand Promotional Effects. Table 5 presents
the findings from the second layer of our model,
which indicate which moderating factors explain the
cross effects for promotional price. The second col-
umn contains the results for the immediate, the third
for the gross, and the fourth for the net effects. We
graphically present these estimates in Figure 3 to illus-
trate the relative importance of the moderating factors
and to show how this is modified by consumer and
competitive dynamics.
Recall that all brand and category characteristics,
except the dummy variables, are standardized. Thus,
the parameter values can be compared and the inter-
cept interpreted as the mean effect across all brand
combinations when the size and price of the attacker
and the victim brands are equal and both brands
are national brands. The asymmetry variables are
all dummy variables, so the parameter values are
straightforward to interpret. The neighborhood price
(share) parameter indicates the difference in cross
effect when comparing a case with equal prices
(shares) with a case in which the prices (shares) are
one standard deviation apart. For the brand-specific
variables, the parameter gives the change in cross
effect when moving from an “average” brand to a
brand that is one standard deviation above the mean
on a certain variable. The category-specific variables
have a similar interpretation.
The only asymmetry that requires further compu-
tation is the national brand/private label asymmetry.
This can be calculated from the parameter estimates
for the national brand (A)/private label (V) and the
private label (A)/national brand (V) dummies pre-
sented in Table 5.
Our database contains a maximum of one private
label brand in each category. We can therefore only
measure cross-price promotional effects for pairs of
national brands (NB(A)/NB(V)), for the impact of a
national brand on a private label (NB(A)/PL(V)), and
for the impact of a private label on a national brand
(PL(A)/NB(V)). As said, we code the effect of pri-
vate labels using two dummy variables, one equal
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Table 5 Posterior Means (and Standard Deviations) for Moderators of the Cross-Price Effects
Immediate effect Gross cumulative effect Net cumulative effect
Intercept 00072 4000085∗∗∗ 00090 4000105∗∗∗ 00118 4000255∗∗∗
Asymmetric price effect (Price A > Price V) 00050 4000065∗∗∗ 00045 4000085∗∗∗ 00058 4000175∗∗∗
Neighborhood price effect (Price V − Price A) −00024 4000035∗∗∗ −00025 4000045∗∗∗ −00033 4000085∗∗∗
Asymmetric share effect (Share A > Share V) 00062 4000075∗∗∗ 00058 4000095∗∗∗ 00051 4000205∗∗
Neighborhood share effect (Share V − Share A) −00023 4000045∗∗∗ −00025 4000065∗∗∗ −00028 4000135∗∗
National brand (A) vs. private label (V) 00140 4000095∗∗∗ 00155 4000135∗∗∗ 00198 4000295∗∗∗
Private label (A) vs. national brand (V) 00024 4000095∗∗∗ 00031 4000125∗∗ 00039 (0.026)
Average price level 00010 4000055∗∗ 00018 4000065∗∗∗ 00021 (0.013)
Average share 00068 4000095∗∗∗ 00076 4000115∗∗∗ 00098 4000255∗∗∗
V’s relative price promotion frequency 00017 4000055∗∗∗ 00015 4000065∗∗ 00026 (0.017)
V’s relative depth of price promotions −00001 (0.003) 00000 (0.005) 00003 (0.012)
V’s relative frequency of display or feature −00006 (0.005) −00006 (0.006) −00023 (0.016)
A’s relative price promotion frequency −00028 4000055∗∗∗ −00025 4000065∗∗∗ −00032 4000165∗∗
A’s relative depth of price promotions −00029 4000065∗∗∗ −00020 4000085∗∗ −00021 (0.016)
A’s relative frequency of display or feature 00013 4000055∗∗∗ 00012 4000075∗ 00008 (0.015)
Perishability −00005 (0.005) −00009 (0.006) −00014 (0.014)
Utilitarian 00002 (0.004) 00001 (0.005) −00008 (0.011)
Budget share −00003 (0.004) 00009 (0.006) 00010 (0.011)
Competitive concentration 00007 (0.005) 00013 4000065∗∗ 00027 4000125∗∗
Interpurchase time (avg) −00012 4000055∗∗ −00016 4000065∗∗ −00013 (0.014)
Store 1 vs. average 00035 4000085∗∗∗ 00007 (0.011) −00017 (0.021)
Store 2 vs. average −00022 4000095∗∗ −00047 4000125∗∗∗ −00077 4000245∗∗∗
Store 3 vs. average 00052 4000085∗∗∗ 00034 4000125∗∗∗ 00006 (0.022)
Store 4 vs. average −00018 4000085∗∗ −00010 (0.010) −00015 (0.023)
Error variance ( 2
4n5
) 00007 40000045∗∗∗ 00007 40000055∗∗∗ 00106 40004285∗∗∗
∗∗∗99% HPD region does not contain zero; ∗∗95% HPD region does not contain zero; ∗90% HPD region does not contain zero.
to 1 if the victim is a private label (dummy 1) and
the other equal to 1 if the attacker is a private label
(dummy 2). According to our coding, the parameters
of both dummies have to be interpreted relative to
the base scenario NB(A)/NB(V). Dummy 1 therefore
captures the difference between NB(A)/PL(V) and
NB(A)/NB(V). It measures how much more (or less)
Figure 3 Relative Importance of Moderating Factors for Immediate, Gross Cumulative, and Net Price Promotional Elasticities
Category-specific variablesAsymmetric and neighborhood effects Brand-specific variables
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national brands take away from private labels than
from other national brands. Dummy 2 captures the
PL(A)/NB(V) versus NB(A)/NB(V) difference. This
measures how much more private labels take away
from national brands than other national brands do.
The NB(A)/PL(V) versus PL(A)/NB(V) asymmetry—
that is, how much more national brands take away
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from private labels than the other way around—is the
difference between the parameters belonging to the
two dummies.11
The national brand (A)/private label (V) dummy is
positive and high; it is 0.140 for the immediate effect.
This means that the price promotion of a national
brand has a significantly greater immediate impact
on a competing private label’s sales than on another
national brand’s performance. We also find a positive
and significant, but much smaller, parameter (0.024)
belonging to the private label (A)/national brand (V)
dummy with respect to the immediate effect. Accord-
ing to this result, private labels take away more from
national brands than other national brands do. Private
label/national brand asymmetry will be the difference
of these two parameters; that is, 00140 − 00024 = 00116.
We then can calculate the gross and net effects for the
private label/national brand asymmetry correspond-
ingly. Figure 3 contains our calculation of the private
label/national brand asymmetry.
Subsequently, we provide some general comments
on the results. Next, we answer the questions we
raised in the introduction.
Table 5 shows that many of the variables do mod-
erate the cross-promotional price effect. We find most
significant estimates for the immediate effect. Com-
paring all significant parameter estimates with our
hypotheses presented in Table 2, we find that almost
all signs are in line with our expectations. Surpris-
ingly, if the attacker is a private label, the cross effect
tends to be significantly larger instead of smaller as
we hypothesized. This indicates that, ceteris paribus,
the sales effect of a price promotion of a private label
on a national brand is stronger than that of a national
brand. This result might be explained by the retailer’s
power in supplementing private labels’ price promo-
tions with additional in-store marketing that draws
customers’ attention.
The final row of Table 5 provides the variances
of the error terms for the cross-price effects. We can
explain a relatively large part of the variation in the
immediate and the gross cross effects, but for the net
effects, we cannot. The size of the variance should be
judged relative to the observed variation in the price
effects, as Figure 2 shows.
Do the (immediate) asymmetric and neighborhood effects
prevail when we simultaneously consider them in one
model? Our findings confirm previous results for
asymmetric and neighborhood price effects, mar-
ket share asymmetry, and national brand/private
label asymmetry, even if all these effects jointly
appear in one model and we control for consumer
11 For further insights about the use and interpretation of dummy
variables in the case of a polytomous variable, i.e., a qualitative
variable with multiple categories, see, e.g., Fox (2008, p. 124).
dynamics, competitive reactions, and brand- and
category-specific factors. In addition, we find that not
only the relative but also the absolute positioning
(especially the average size) of the two brands has
a significant influence on the immediate cross-price
promotional elasticities. The positive parameter of the
average share variable suggests more intense brand
switching between two large brands than between
small ones. This is a rather surprising result in light of
previous literature. An explanation may be that large
brands tend to have broad target groups, whereas
small brands with a smaller target segment deliver
products that are more customized. Brands offering
customized products usually have more loyal cus-
tomers. Fornell (1992) comes to similar conclusions
when considering heterogeneity in consumer tastes.
He argues that, on average, for customers of smaller
firms the distance between the ideal product and
the actual product offering is much smaller than
that for larger firms. Accordingly, customers of larger
firms are, on average, less satisfied than customers of
smaller firms and thus also less loyal. Furthermore,
large brand pairs are more likely to overlap more in
their customer base than smaller brands, which may
also lead to more intense brand switching.
Which asymmetric and neighborhood effects are the
strongest? Figure 3 clearly shows that the national
brand (A)/private label (V) asymmetry is by far the
strongest moderator. This holds for the immediate
effect as well as for the gross and net effects. The
asymmetric price and share effects are the next most
important. The neighborhood share and the neigh-
borhood price effects are relatively small. However,
these neighborhood effects are still more important
than any of the category variables. For easier interpre-
tation of the combined asymmetric and neighborhood
effects, we graphically depict the impact of the differ-
ence in size or share on the three cross-promotional
price elasticities in Figure 4.
The horizontal axis of the plot in, for example, the
upper left block shows the relative price position-
ing of the attacker and victim brands, and the ver-
tical axis shows the contribution of the neighborhood
and asymmetric price effect to the immediate cross-
price elasticities. Again, a difference of 1 in “price”
means that the regular prices are one standard devi-
ation apart. The asymmetric price and share effects
are clearly more influential than the neighborhood
effects. As the upper left block shows, if the attacker
is priced higher than the victim brand, it will have a
substantially greater effect on the victim’s sales than
if it was priced lower. According to the neighbor-
hood effect, this effect disappears if the two brands
are priced farther apart. However, for the neighbor-
hood price effect to compensate for the asymmetric
price effect, the two brands should be priced far apart,
with a price difference of at least 1.5 to 2 standard
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Figure 4 Contribution of Neighborhood and Asymmetric Effects for Price and Size to the Cross-Price Effects, Together with the 90% HPD Region
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deviations. This confirms that the asymmetric price
and share effects are stronger than the corresponding
neighborhood effects.
The strong asymmetric effects, together with our
results for the private label/national brand asymme-
try, which is about twice the size of the asymmet-
ric effects, confirm that the national brand/private
label asymmetry has the greatest influence on cross-
brand elasticity. First-level results confirm the impor-
tance of national brand/private label asymmetry.
We constructed a table similar to Table 4 for only
national brand (A)/private label (V) brand pairs (not
reported), which reveals that of the 495 selected
immediate cross-promotional effects, 99% are positive
and 80% are significant at 95%. Thus, positive and
significant cross-promotional effects occur much more
frequently for national brand (A)/private label (V)
brand pairs than in general.
In addition to the asymmetric and neighborhood
effects, we include brand- and category-specific vari-
ables in our model. We find notable results for
these variables. Among the brand- and category-
specific variables, brand-specific characteristics have
a stronger influence. In addition, both the attacker
and victim brands’ promotional activities seem to
have some influence on the cross-price effect, though
those of the attacker play a much more important role
overall (see Figure 3 and Table 5). Frequent use of
price promotions by the victim brand increases, and
frequent and deep promotions by the attacker brand
decrease the effect of the attacker’s price promotions
on the victim brand. As argued previously, these out-
comes likely result from the eroded brand equity of
a heavily promoted brand. In contrast, the frequent
use of display and feature by the attacker increases
the influence of its price promotions. Perhaps such
a frequent use of display and feature increases con-
sumers’ awareness of the brand and therefore the like-
lihood of being in their consideration set. The average
interpurchase time is the only category variable that
significantly influences the cross-brand elasticity in
the short run.
The victim’s relative depth of price promotions and
the frequency of feature and display are not relevant.
This also holds for the category variables perishabil-
ity, utilitarian, and budget share.
For competitive concentration, we find positive
parameters, in line with our expectations. In more
concentrated categories, customers have less oppor-
tunities to encounter price promotion opportuni-
ties. Thus, the price-sensitive segment may be more
inclined to use these opportunities, which is reflected
in the positive moderating parameter for the imme-
diate effect. These customers may also have an espe-
cially strong inclination for preemptive switching,
which is reflected in a positive and significant mod-
erating parameter for the gross effect, approximately
double the size of the corresponding parameter for
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the immediate effect. Finally, we find that categories
with shorter interpurchase times face greater immedi-
ate, gross, and net cross-price promotional effects, in
line with our expectations based on the literature.
What is the influence of consumer dynamics, and does
a cross-brand post-promotional dip exist? Dynamic con-
sumer responses do affect the cross-price promotional
effect. Table 4 and Figure 2 both show that for the
majority (60%) of cross-brand pairs, the gross cumu-
lative effect is larger than the immediate effect. This
can also be observed by comparing the estimated
intercept for the immediate and the gross effect in
Table 5. Including consumer dynamics increases the
cross-brand price elasticity between two similar, aver-
age national brands. This difference is statistically sig-
nificant (zero not in 90% HPD region) and provides
evidence for a cross-brand post-promotion dip. The
lack of more overwhelming evidence may be due to
the differences in consumers’ inclinations to stockpile
across brands and categories.
Almost the same set of moderating variables is rel-
evant in explaining the variation in cross-price elas-
ticities when including consumer dynamics than for
the immediate effect. The only exception is compet-
itive concentration, which has a significant moder-
ating effect on the gross elasticities but not on the
immediate elasticities. However, we observe some
changes in the impact of the moderating variables.
The moderating impact of a variable on the cross-
brand post-promotional dip is given by the impact
of the variable on the gross effect less the impact on
the immediate effect. If this difference is positive for
a certain variable, an increase in the variable goes
together with an increase in the cross-promotional
dip. In general, these are positive for the frequency
and depth of price promotions of the attacker brand,
the average share and price levels, the two national
brand-private label dummies, category budget share,
and competitive concentration (see Table 5). So, we
find, for example, that a national brand’s price promo-
tion not only induces substantial immediate switch-
ing from the private label brand but also results in
preemptive switching, which further reduces sales
of the victim private label brand in future periods.
All changes together lead to an even more promi-
nent national brand/private label asymmetry. We also
observe that the results for the cross-brand post-
promotion dip are in line with the findings on own-
brand post-promotion dips in, for example, Macé and
Neslin (2004) and Fok et al. (2006). Thus, these vari-
ables influence stockpiling from both the promoted
brand’s and its competitors’ customers, which leads
to reduced sales of both the promoted brand and the
competitor’s in subsequent periods.
The other variables have no impact on the
cross-brand post-promotional dip or have a nega-
tive impact. For example, the impact of the price
asymmetry decreases when we account for consumer
dynamic effects. Although a promotion of a high-
priced brand induces consumers to switch away from
lower-priced brands, they may not be able to afford
stockpiling for future consumption. This behavior is
likely related to the budget constraints of the con-
sumer base of the low-priced brands.
What is the influence of competitive dynamics? Includ-
ing competitive reactions further alters the influence of
the moderating variables. A price promotion of brand
A may induce brand V to react to mitigate its ini-
tial sales loss. If this response is successful, the net
cross-price elasticity should be lower than the gross
elasticity. However, competitive dynamics are more
complex in reality, in that price promotions of brand A
may stimulate brands other than V to respond, which
would further reduce sales of brand V. Furthermore,
competitive reactions by brand V or any other brand
can cause a chain of competitive reactions.
Table 4 shows that for 59% of the cross-brand pairs,
the net effect is larger than the gross effect. This is
also reflected in the estimated intercepts; the inter-
cept for the net effect is significantly larger (zero
not in the 90% HPD region) than for the immedi-
ate effect. Figure 3 shows that the impact of most
of the moderating variables is amplified when we
also include competitive dynamics. Several variables
remain significant for the net effect, even though com-
petitive reactions induce substantial uncertainty in
our results and thereby increase the standard devia-
tions of the parameters of the second-level model con-
siderably (column 4 of Table 5). Overall, the national
brand (A)/store brand (V) asymmetry is still the most
influential. The difference between the coefficient of
this variable for the net effect versus the gross effect is
significantly different from zero using the 80% HPD
region.
Regarding the brand-specific variables, for the net
effect, only the attacker’s price promotion frequency
remains significant, and competitive reactions amplify
its influence. Thus, frequent price promotions seem
especially harmful for the attacker brand. They not
only erode brand equity, such that the brand attracts
less brand switching and experiences lower imme-
diate cross-brand elasticities, but also induce more
competitive retaliation, as reflected by the lower mod-
erating parameters for the net elasticities. The only
category-specific variable that remains significant is
competitive concentration. Competitive reactions also
amplify the moderating effect of competitive con-
centration. Overall, competitive reactions accumulate
rather than diminish cross-price elasticities and the
effect of moderating variables.
5. Conclusions and Discussion
This study sheds new light on asymmetric and
neighborhood cross-brand price effects, beyond prior
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research that has focused on immediate cross-brand
promotional price estimates and considered the
effects independently or, at best, with a limited
set of alternative moderating factors. In particular,
we offer evidence of price and share asymmetries,
neighborhood price and share effects, and national
brand/private label asymmetry in immediate cross-
promotional elasticities, even when we include the
effects jointly in a single model. These results also
hold even when we integrate consumer and compet-
itive dynamics. Thus, our results firmly reinforce the
existence of these effects.
A new finding is the importance of a national
brand/private label asymmetry. This asymmetry
exists even after we control for price and share asym-
metries. We find that this asymmetry has by far the
strongest influence on cross-price elasticities, followed
by the asymmetric price and share effects. Brand-
specific characteristics, especially those of the attacker
brand, also shape cross-price elasticities considerably.
An important result is that competitive reactions
accumulate rather than diminish cross-price elastic-
ities and the effect of moderating variables. These
findings imply that competitive reactions result in
losses for competitors. At first glance, this is a sur-
prising result, because we would expect that victim
brands would retaliate against the promotion of the
attacker brand and thereby make up the sales losses
suffered from the attacker’s action. The literature pro-
vides several potential explanations for our finding.
First, both Pauwels (2004) and Steenkamp et al. (2005)
show that competitive reactions are as likely to be
accommodating as retaliatory. Second, company iner-
tia or retailer dynamic support may cause the ini-
tial promotion itself to last for more weeks (Pauwels
2004, 2007). Finally, this result may be due to the
complex nature of competitive dynamics captured in
our model. Price promotions of brand A probably
hurt several competing brands on the market, not
only brand V, whose sales suffered from the attacker’s
promotion. This may stimulate brands other than
V to respond, which would further reduce sales of
brand V. Furthermore, the price promotion of brand
A can cause a chain of competitive reactions. The
responsive move of brand V to the price promotion of
brand A will hurt at least some of its competitors. As
a result, these brands may react, and their price pro-
motions may further reduce sales of V in the future.
Among the brand-specific variables, the attacker
brand’s promotional activities seem to most affect
the cross-brand price promotional elasticities. This
suggests that though a brand can effectively use
a broad set of marketing tools to influence the
effect of promotions on the sales of other brands,
it is more limited in defending its own sales from
other brands’ promotions. Overall, the significant
attacker characteristics coincide with the own brand-
specific variables that influence own-brand elastici-
ties. Apparently, some of these earlier established own
effects arise from higher brand switching. For the net
effect, among the brand-specific variables, only the
attacker’s price promotion frequency remains signifi-
cant; competitive reactions amplify its influence.
Category characteristics have a limited influence on
the cross-promotional price effect. Among these, com-
petitive concentration and the average interpurchase
time in the category have a moderate influence on the
cross effects.
We also show that dynamic consumer responses and
competitive reactions affect cross-brand price elastici-
ties. Overall, the cross-promotional price effect tends
to increase and the impact of moderating variables
is amplified when dynamics are taken into account.
This especially holds for the national brand/private
label asymmetric effect. This provides evidence of
the existence of preemptive switching, resulting in
cross-brand post-promotional dips. Such stockpiling
not only causes a dip for the promoted brand but
also reduces sales of competing brands in future peri-
ods. We find that, on average, the cross-brand post-
promotion dip is approximately 13% of the immedi-
ate cross effect and 25% of the own post-promotion
dip. However, our results also suggest that the size of
this dip varies, depending on consumers’ inclination
to stockpile for a brand and within a category.
5.1. Implications
Our results have implications for many open man-
agerial and academic questions in the fast-moving
consumer goods industry. We found a large private
label/national brand asymmetry, such that private
labels are vulnerable to national brands’ promotions.
Although private labels continue to improve their
quality and market presence and aim to increase
store loyalty (Sethuraman 2009), their customers can
still be easily tempted by competing national brands’
promotions. Therefore, to improve their performance
and retail margins, private labels must first develop
their customer loyalty. Some retailers have already
begun advertising their private labels, which may be
a suitable marketing tool to establish new associa-
tions in consumers’ minds, reduce the quality gap
perceptions, and increase brand equity and brand loy-
alty. Even if retailers cannot match the advertising
intensity of national brands (Steenkamp et al. 2010),
they could exploit their exceptionally high control
over in-store marketing activities and the beneficial
spillover effects from their store image (Ailawadi and
Keller 2004) to build private label equity and loy-
alty. Improved brand associations related to perceived
quality would also enable managers to increase pri-
vate label prices without a significant loss in share.
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Thus, private labels should try to close the price gap
with their national competitors.
Furthermore, we find that price and size asymme-
try were more important in shaping cross-brand elas-
ticities than the corresponding neighborhood effects.
Thus, brands should monitor the higher-tier brands’
promotional activities closely. This is important for
logistic and profitability management of the brand.
Among the attacker and the victim brands’ promo-
tional activities, it is mainly the attacker brand that
has some influence. This suggests that though a brand
can effectively use a broad set of marketing tools to
influence the effect of its promotions on the sales of
other brands, it is more limited in defending its own
sales from other brands’ promotions.
Among the brand-specific variables, frequent price
promotions are especially harmful for a brand. They
result in lowered price and quality perceptions and
increased price sensitivity of consumers (Mela et al.
1997) and, thus, erode brand equity. They also draw
competitors’ attention to the brand’s activities. From
the eroded brand equity, frequent promotions of a
brand make the brand more vulnerable to other
brands’ price promotions, and its promotions attract
less brand switching from others as well. Furthermore,
frequent promotions induce more competitive retali-
ation, as reflected by the lower moderating parame-
ters for the net elasticities. It takes considerable effort
and money to build a strong brand and establish the
appropriate associations. Frequent use of price promo-
tions, driven by short-term goals, may, however, mod-
ify these associations and reduce brand performance
in the long-run. Therefore, brand and category man-
agers should consider this trade-off when determin-
ing promotional activities. The use of infrequent but
deep discounts may be a better idea because they seem
not to affect cross-price elasticities, indicating that they
harm brand equity to a lesser extent.
Finally, our results on the effect of consumer res-
ponses and competitive reactions, and our findings
for preemptive switching, suggest that cross-brand
consumer and competitive dynamics exist. Thus, they
must be taken into account when analyzing the effects
of price deals on competitors’ performance.
5.2. Future Research
This study could be extended in several ways.
First, we restricted our analysis to the cross-price
effects within a category. Additional analysis that
includes possible moderating factors for cross-price
effects across categories, such as complementarity
and substitutability, would provide new insights
into cross-price elasticities, which would be useful
for both researchers and practitioners. Second, our
results draw attention to the importance of private
label brand loyalty. Many studies have investigated
whether and how private labels boost store loyalty,
but little research has examined whether and how
developing private label loyalty might benefit retail-
ers. An exception is Ailawadi et al. (2008), who show
that private label share significantly affects three mea-
sures of behavioral loyalty that can benefit the retailer:
share of wallet, share of items purchased, and share of
shopping trips. Even if retailers cannot use advertis-
ing to the same extent as national brands to build and
maintain brand equity, Keller (2008) suggests alterna-
tive ways to develop associations. Furthermore, retail-
ers enjoy an advantage because of their high control
over in-store marketing activities.
In addition, our analysis is based on a data set
from the United States and contained a maximum of
one private label brand in a category. Thus, further
research could investigate whether our results pre-
vail in a western European setting, in which aver-
age quality perceptions of private labels are higher
and less uncertain, and the private label positioning
is more consistent (Erdem et al. 2004). Moreover, in
these markets, several private labels are often present
in a category, allowing for private label tiers (espe-
cially premium private labels), and their presence
influences perceptions of the incumbent private label
and national brands (Geyskens et al. 2010).
Finally, our analysis pertains solely to fast-moving
consumer goods. An important question would be
whether our findings generalize to other categories,
such as durable products or categories that induce
greater involvement among customers.
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Appendix A. Bayesian Estimation
In this appendix, we discuss the details of the Bayesian
analysis of our model. We consider some technical details,
including the conditional distributions used in the sampling
algorithm. Furthermore, we present and motivate all priors
used.
A.1. Sales Models
For the error correction model, we consider the exact likeli-
hood function. For the first observation, lags are not avail-
able; therefore we set this observation equal to the long-run
equilibrium level. That is,
log Sc1 = −ç−11c c +Bck logPck1 +
K∑
k=1
B∗ckXck1 + c11 (15)
with 1c ∼ N401Vc5, where Vc is the long-run variance.
This variance can be obtained from solving the system by
repeated substitution and is given by Vc =
∑
j=04I +ç1c5j ·
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èc4I + ç′1c5j . The variance is finite if the eigenvalues of
4I +ç1c5 are within the unit circle, that is, in case of
stationarity.
To derive the likelihood function, we summarize the ele-
ments of Ac and Bc , which are related to the immediate
and gross own effects, respectively, in the Ic-dimensional
vectors c = 6Aii1 c7Ici=1, c = 6Bii1 c7Ici=1. For these parameters,
we impose the hierarchical priors ic ∼ N4125 and ic ∼
N4125 for i = 11 0 0 0 1 Ic1 c = 11 0 0 0 1C0 The second-stage
equations (11) and (12) are compactly written as ˜lc =
Z′lcä1 +415lc and ˜lc =Z′lcä2 +425lc 1 where Zlc collects all vari-
ables in Equations (11) and (12). The likelihood function of
the model for the sales in all categories is given by
C∏
c=1
∫
c1c
∫
˜c1 ˜c
4c1301Vc5
Tc∏
t=2
4ct301èc5
·
Ic∏
i=1
4ic31
2
54ic31
2
5
·
Ic 4Ic−15∏
l=1
4˜lc3ä
′
1Zic1
2
415
5
·4˜lc3ä′2Zlc12425 5 d˜c d˜c dc dc1 (16)
where 4x31è5 is the density function of the (multivari-
ate) normal distribution, with mean  and variance è eval-
uated at x.
To obtain posterior results for this part of the model, we
use the Gibbs sampling technique of Geman and Geman
(1984) with data augmentation; see Tanner and Wong
(1987). The Bayesian analysis is largely based on uninforma-
tive priors for the model parameters. However, some pri-
ors are used. The settings for the prior parameters appear
in §A.4.
Next, we derive the full conditional posterior distribu-
tions of the model parameters and all latent variables. In
deriving the sampling distributions, we build on the general
results of Zellner (1971, Chapter VIII) and Fok et al. (2006).
Sampling of ç1c
To sample ç1c , we rely on the Metropolis–Hastings sampler
(Hastings 1970, Metropolis et al. 1953). As the candidate, we
consider the distribution that would result if we ignore the
first observation. We write Equation (1) as
ãlogSct−c−Ac logPct−
K∑
k=1
A∗ckãXckt
=ç1c
(
logSc1t−1 −Bc logPc1t−1 −
K∑
k=1
B∗ckXck1t−1
)
+ct (17)
and summarize this equation as Yct =ç1cWct +ct , where Yct
and Wct denote the corresponding terms in Equation (17).
Ignoring the observation for t = 1, we would obtain a nor-
mal full conditional posterior distribution with mean çˆ′1c
and variance èˆç′1c given by
çˆ′1c =
( Tc∑
t=2
WctW
′
ct
)−1( Tc∑
t=2
WctY
′
ct
)
1 and
èˆç′1c =
(
èc ⊗
( Tc∑
t=2
WctW
′
ct
)−1)
0 (18)
The sampled candidate is denoted by çcand1c . The differ-
ence in the candidate and the target density is only in
the first observation, which gives as acceptance–rejection
probability:
41c301Vc5ç1c=çcand1c
41c301Vc5ç1c=çold1c
1 (19)
where çold1c denotes the previous draw and c1 = log Sc1 +
ç−11c c − Bc logPc1 −
∑K
k=1 B
∗
ckXck1. See Chib and Greenberg
(1995) for a similar approach in an exact likelihood anal-
ysis of an autoregressive model. To ensure that all draws
correspond to a stationary ç1c matrix, we use a prior that
assigns probability 0 if the largest eigenvalue of I +ç1c is
larger than 0095. This is implemented by rejecting each ç1c
for which an eigenvalue exceeds 0095. This prior is further
motivated in §A.4.
Sampling of èc
For èc , we also use a Metropolis–Hastings sampler
in which we construct the candidate ignoring the
first observations. The candidate ècandc is sampled from
an inverted Wishart distribution with scale parameter∑Tc
t=2 ct
′
ct and Tc − 1 degrees of freedom, where ct =
ã log Sct − c − Ac logPct −
∑K
k=1 A
∗
ckãXckt − ç1c4log Sc1 t−1 −
Bc logPc1 t−1 −
∑K
k=1 B
∗
ckãXck1 t−15. The acceptance–rejection
probability equals
41c301Vc5èc=ècandc
41c301Vc5èc=èoldc
1 (20)
where èoldc denotes the previous draw of èc .
Sampling of 1, and än1n= 112
The full conditional distributions of  and  are
N441/
∑C
c=1 Ic5
∑C
c=1
∑Ic
i=1 ic , 4
2
/
∑C
c=1 Ic5) and N441/
∑C
c=1 Ic5 ·∑C
c=1
∑Ic
i=1 ic , 4
2
/
∑C
c=1 Ic5), respectively. The full condi-
tional distribution of ä1 is multivariate normal with
mean 4
∑C
c=1
∑Ic 4Ic−15
l=1 ZlcZ
′
lc5
−14
∑C
c=1
∑Ic 4Ic−15
l=1 Zlc˜lc5 and vari-
ance 2
415
4
∑C
c=1
∑Ic 4Ic−15
l=1 ZlcZ
′
lc5
−1. The full conditional for ä2
is analogous.
Sampling of 21
2
, and 
2
4n5
, n= 112
These variances are sampled from inverted chi-square dis-
tributions with scale parameter and degrees of freedom as
defined in the following overview.
Variance Scale parameter Degrees of freedom
2 1 +
C∑
c=1
Ic∑
i=1
4ic −52 2 +
C∑
c=1
Ic
2 1 +
C∑
c=1
Ic∑
i=1
4ic −52 2 +
C∑
c=1
Ic
2
415
1 +
C∑
c=1
Ic 4Ic−15∑
l=1
4˜lc −Z′lcä152 2 +
C∑
c=1
Ic4Ic − 15
2
425
1 +
C∑
c=1
Ic 4Ic−15∑
l=1
4˜lc −Z′lcä252 2 +
C∑
c=1
Ic4Ic − 15
The  terms result from the priors, which we use to improve
convergence of our Gibbs sampler (Hobert and Casella 1996).
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Sampling of c and c
We split up Pct = 4Pc1t1 0 0 0 1 PcIc t5′ into the scalars P owncit = Pcit
and the row vectors P crosscit = 6Pcjt7Icj=16=i to disentangle the
own effects from the cross effects. Next, we define P ownct =
diag4P ownc1t 1 0 0 0 1 P
own
cIc t
5 and P crossct = diag4P crossc1t 1 0 0 0 1 P crosscIc t 5. To
sample c and c jointly, we write
log Sc1 − logP crossc1 ˜c −
K∑
k=1
B∗ckXck1 +ç−11c c
=
(
01 logP ownc1
)(
c
c
)
+ c11 (21)
and
ã log Sct −c −ç1c
(
log Sc1 t−1 − logP crossc1 t−1˜c −
K∑
k=1
B∗ckXck1t−1
)
−ã logP crossct ˜c −
K∑
k=1
A∗ckãXckt
= 4ã logP ownct 1−ç1c logP ownc1 t−15
(
c
c
)
+ ct1 (22)
which we rewrite as Yct = Wct
(
c
c
) + ct , with the obvious
definitions for Yct and Wct . The variance of c1 is Vc , and
the variance of ct , t > 1 equals èc . Note that we use differ-
ent definitions for Wct and Yct for t = 1 versus t > 1. Next,
we write the hierarchical priors as −I = −Ic + 1c and
−I = −Ic + 2c 0 The error term nc is normal distributed
with mean 0 and covariance matrix 2I for n = 1, and 2I
for n= 2. To sample c and c , we combine and standardize
the equations
Vc
−1/2Yc1 = Vc−1/2Wc1
(
c
c
)
+Vc−1/2c11
èc
−1/2Yct =èc−1/2Wct
(
c
c
)
+èc−1/2ct1

−

I
−

I
=

− 1

I 0
0 − 1

I

(
c
c
)
+

1

1c
1

2c
 1
(23)
where A−1/2 denotes the inverse of the Choleski decom-
position of the matrix A; that is, A−1/2 = 4A1/25−1 with
A1/2A1/2
′ = A. Thus, the full conditional posterior distribu-
tion of 4′c1
′
c5
′ is normal with mean


1
2
I 0
0
1
2
I
+W ′c1V −1c Wc1 +
Tc∑
t=2
4W ′ctè
−1
c Wct5

−1
·



2
I

2
I
+4W ′c1V −1c Yc15+ Tc∑
t=2
4W ′ctè
−1
c Yct5
 (24)
and covariance matrix

1
2
I 0
0
1
2
I
+W ′c1V −1c Wc1 +
Tc∑
t=2
4W ′ctè
−1
c Wct5

−1
0 (25)
Sampling of c , A
∗
ck, B
∗
ck, ˜c , and ˜c
Note that
∑K
k=1 B
∗
ckXck1 t−1 = 4X ′c11 t−1 ⊗ I1 0 0 0 1X ′cK1 t−1 ⊗ I5 ·
vec4B∗c11 0 0 0 1B
∗
cK5, which we define to equal Xc1 t−1
∗
c . Fur-
thermore,
∑K
k=1 A
∗
ckãXckt equals 4ãX
′
c1t ⊗ I1 0 0 0 1ãX ′cKt ⊗ I5 ·
vec4A∗c11 0 0 0 1A
∗
cK5, which we denote by ãXc1 t
∗
c . Equations
(15) and (1) can now be written as
logSc1 −logP ownc1 c
= 4−ç−11c 0 logP crossc1 0 Xc1 5+c11
ãlogSct−ãlogP ownct c−ç1c4logSc1t−1 −logP ownc1t−1c5
= 4 IIc 1 ãlogP crossct 1−ç1c logP crossc1t−11 ãXct1−ç1cXc1t−1 5+ct1
(26)
where  = 4′c1 ˜′c1 ˜′c1∗c ′1∗c ′5, and ˜c and ˜c capture the
cross effects in the matrices Ac and Bc , respectively. This
system can be written in the multivariate regression model
Yct = Wct + ct1 where Yct contains the left-hand side of
Equation (26) and Wct captures the right-hand side. Note
that Wc1 is differently defined from Wct for t > 1. The error
term is normal distributed with mean 0 and covariance
matrix èc (Vc for the first observation).
In a similar manner as before, we write the information
from the second layer of the hierarchical model as −U˜ 1c =
−IIc 4Ic−15˜c + 415c and − U˜ 2c = −IIc 4Ic−15˜c + 425c 1 where now
U˜ nc equals an Ic4Ic − 15 vector with elements Z′lcän, n= 112.
Collecting and standardizing both equations, we obtain
Vc
−1/2Yc1 = Vc−1/2Wc1 +Vc−1/2c11
èc
−1/2Yct =èc−1/2Wct +èc−1/2ct1
− 1
415
U˜ 1c
− 1
425
U˜ 2c
= P +

1
415
415c
1
425
425c
 1
(27)
where
P =

0 − 1
415
IIc 4Ic−15 0 0 0
0 0 − 1
425
IIc 4Ic−15 0 0
 0 (28)
Thus, the full conditional distribution of  is normal with
mean(
P ′P +W ′c1V −1c Wc1 +
Tc∑
t=2
4W ′ctè
−1
c Wct5
)−1
·


0
1
2
415
U˜ 1c
1
2
425
U˜ 2c

+ 4W ′c1V −1c Yc15+
Tc∑
t=2
4W ′ctè
−1
c Yct5

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and covariance matrix(
P ′P +W ′c1V −1c Wc1 +
Tc∑
t=2
4W ′ctè
−1
c Wct5
)−1
0
A.2. Price Model
The model for the prices in category c is a VARX. Note that
we ignore the shrinkage effect from the hierarchical model
for the net effects. For each category, we can therefore sepa-
rately perform a Bayesian analysis. We rewrite the original
model
ã logPct = c +Dc log Sc1 t−1 +ç2c logPc1 t−1
+
K∑
k=1
D∗ckXk1 ct + ct (29)
as ã logPct = Mctc + ct1 where Mct = 4I1 I ⊗ log S ′c1 t−11 I ⊗
logP ′c1 t−11 I ⊗ X11 ct1 0 0 0 1 I ⊗ XK1ct5 and where  =
4′c1vec4Dc5
′1 vec4ç2c5′, vec4D∗c15
′1 0 0 0 1vec4D∗c15
′5′. We allow
for a normal prior distribution on  with mean ¯ and
inverse variance è−1 . Furthermore, ct ∼ N401ìc5. Condi-
tional on ìc and the data, c has a normal distribution
with mean(
Tc∑
t=2
M ′ctì
−1Mct +è−1
)−1( Tc∑
t=2
M ′ctì
−1
c ã logPct +è−1 
)
0
Conditional on c and the data, ì has an inverted Wishart
distribution with scale matrix
∑Tc
t=24ã logPct − Mctc5 ·
4ã logPct −Mct5′1 and Tc − 1 degrees of freedom.
A.3. Net Effects
We obtain draws of the net effect. For each such draw,
we take one draw from the joint posterior of all sales mod-
els and one draw from the joint posterior of the price mod-
els. Next, we use Equation (9) to obtain a draw for the
net effects. We denote such a draw by 4h5c for c = 11 0 0 0 1C.
We then use these draws to obtain pseudo-posterior draws
of ä3 in ˜lc =Z′lcä3 +435lc .
Overall, the MCMC chain to sample ä3 and 2435
is straightforward. The hth draw for ä3 comes from
a normal with mean 4
∑
l ZlcZ
′
lc5
−1∑
l Zlc
4h5
lc and variance
2
435
4h−15
4
∑
l ZlcZ
′
lc5
−1. The hth draw of 2
435
comes from an
inverted chi-square with location 1 +
∑
l4
4h5
lc −Z′lcä352 and
degrees of freedom equal to 2 +
∑C
c=1 Ic4Ic − 15.
A.4. Prior Settings
For the gross cumulative effect to exist, we theoretically
must ensure that zero posterior mass for values of ç1c cor-
responds to nonstationary sales. Therefore, we impose a
prior that restricts ç1c to the stationary region. This prior is
implemented by rejecting a draw if the largest eigenvalue
of I +ç1c is larger than 0.95. Note that this also rules out
extremely large gross cumulative effects. Note that such a
prior is only justified if the sales are actually stationary.
We checked this assumption by counting the number of
rejected draws. We only needed to reject 779 draws of the
total 165×101000 draws. This is less than 0.005%. Thus, the
assumption of stationarity is empirically justified.
Next, to improve convergence of the MCMC sampler,
we impose some weak prior information on the variances
in the second-level models. We use an inverted chi-square
prior with scale 1 = 1 and degrees of freedom equal to
2 = 5 (see Hobert and Casella 1996 for a discussion).
For the net effects to exist, the combined model for price
and sales as given in Equation (5) must be stationary. Note
that it is not strictly necessary that the VARX model for
prices in Equation (2) be stationary because the sales also
depend on prices. To avoid very extreme and theoretically
unlikely draws for the net effect, we set normal priors on
the elements of ç2c . We set the corresponding elements of ¯
and è−1 to −008 and 25 for the own effects and to 0 and 25
for the cross effects, respectively. These settings roughly cor-
respond to a prior confidence interval for the autoregressive
parameters on the diagonal of I +ç2c of 6−00210067; for the
off-diagonal elements, the interval is 6−00410047. To assess
the impact of this prior, we reran the analysis after doubling
the intervals to 6−006117 and 6−00810087, respectively. Doing
so only led to small changes in the posterior means of the
impact of the moderating variables on the net effect. The
presence of some extreme draws of the net effect for indi-
vidual brands did increase the posterior standard deviation.
The other parameters in the price models have a flat prior
or an uninformative one.
Appendix B. Controlling for
Product Introductions/Deletions
Changes in the number of products available in a category
can have a major impact on a market. In our model, we
control for this by including the number of products avail-
able for each brand as additional explanatory variables. This
information is not directly available in the data. In this
appendix, we discuss how we construct these variables.
First, we use the raw data to count the number of unique
products (defined using the universal product code, or
UPC) sold for each brand in each week; we denote this
variable for brand i in week t as #UPCit . However, #UPCit
shows a lot of variation that is not related to product intro-
ductions or deletions but actually caused by the total brand
sales. For example, when sales are relatively low in a partic-
ular week, some of the less popular UPCs will not be sold at
all. Therefore, just including #UPCit in a sales model would
lead to an endogeneity problem. We solve this problem by
removing all short-term variation from #UPCit that is not
related to changes in the assortment. We do so by applying
the following rules to all brands and all weeks; that is, we
first apply rule 1 to all weeks, then rule 2, and so forth.
Rule 1: Remove temporary dips of length 1. If #UPCit <
min8#UPCi1 t−11#UPCit+19, the low observed assortment size
is most likely not due to a deletion. We replace #UPCit by
min8#UPCi1 t−11 #UPCit+19.
Rule 2: Remove temporary dips of length 2. If #UPCit <
min8#UPCi1 t−11 #UPCit+29 and #UPCit+1 < min8#UPCi1 t−11
#UPCit+29, the low observed assortment size at t and t +
1 is most likely not due to a deletion. We set #UPCit =
#UPCit+1 = min8#UPCi1 t−11 #UPCit+29.
Rule 3: Remove temporary dips of length 3. If #UPCit <
min8#UPCi1 t−11#UPCit+39 and #UPCit+1 < min8#UPCi1 t−11
#UPCit+39, and #UPCit+2 < min8#UPCi1 t−11#UPCit+39, we
set #UPCit = #UPCit+1 = #UPCit+2 = min8#UPCi1 t−11
#UPCit+39.
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Rule 4: Remove temporary peaks of length 1. If #UPCit >
max8#UPCi1 t−1#UPCi1 t+19, the high assortment size at time t
is most likely not due to a real product introduction. There-
fore, we replace this value with max8#UPCi1 t−1#UPCi1 t+19.
After applying these rules, we obtain series that reflect
the true development in the assortment. All the spurious
short-term variation is removed. Plots of the resulting #UPC
series are available from the authors upon request.
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